AFTERNOON PANEL

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Okay. If you can all take your seats, we’ll get started. Today I’m delighted that we’ve got such a great panel of experts to dig deeper into the issue of U.S. force posture and what it means for Okinawa given the changing regional security environment. And I will introduce each speaker as their time comes up. The first speaker will be Dr. Morton Halperin, and he is also another intellectual titan in the field of international security affairs and foreign policy.

I believe he was and still is the youngest person to be appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Johnson Administration, and then later served on the National Security Council, I guess in the Nixon Administration. And Dr. Halperin played a critical role in the policy process that led to the reversion of Okinawa. And 42 years later, he visited Okinawa for the first time since reversion. During the Clinton Administration he served as Director of Policy Planning under Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and now he is a senior advisor at the Open Society Foundations. Dr. Halperin.

DR. HALPERIN: Thank you very much. It this on? Can you hear me? It’s a great pleasure for me to be here and to join this discussion. As you heard, I’ve been involved in the Okinawa issue for many years, and some of the insights that I got from working on the reversion issue I think are unfortunately relevant to this day in trying to understand the force posture and why it is so difficult to change.

Soon after I went to work in the Pentagon in 1966 I had a – I was assigned to work on the Okinawa issue and had a conversation with a very senior naval officer, and I asked him two questions and got two rather startling answers, which I think are very informative in understanding the situation to this day. I asked him first, could he describe for me the American military bases on Okinawa and what we use them for. And his answer was, we have no military bases on Okinawa. And I was, of course, a little surprised and I said, how can that be? And he said, Okinawa is an American military base. And that was not hyperbole, it was literally the way the American military looked upon Okinawa until the day that reversion took place. I had visited Okinawa during that period, and if any of you did you would know that it was, in fact, the entire island was run as if it was an American military base. Cars drove on the right side of the road, the dollar was the currency, English was the language that was spoken.

And I asked him in the follow-up question, I said, but do you realize that there are a million Japanese living on this island. And he said, yes, that is an administrative inconvenience that we have to deal with, but we do. And they did, the Japanese who lived on the island were treated as if they lived on a military base and needed to conform to the rules of anybody living on an American military base. And that had consequences for where the bases – the actual military installations were put. Because the American military did not think of this as we’re in another country’s sovereign territory, can we put bases and expect to operate them for a long period of time. It thought simply of where is the best place to put these military installations on an American military base, which included literally the entire island.

And the second question that I asked him was, when will you be prepared to give Okinawa – restore sovereignty back to Japan? Because, as you remember, the United States in the peace treaty recognized
the residual sovereignty of Japan at a time that the United States no longer required sovereignty in its security interests. And his answer was equally dispiriting, he said, we have a blue-sky policy. And I said, what does that mean? And he said, we will give sovereignty back when there is a blue sky. And I said, yes. And he said, when there are no clouds. That is, when there are no security problems in Asia, then we will return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty.

Now, obviously nobody expected there to be no security clouds in Asia. Here we are 60, 70 years later and there are clearly more intense security clouds than before. So, the answer is that the American military had no intention of ever giving back the island. They had every intention of running it as an American military base as far into the future as any long-range plan of the Pentagon projected.

And when I returned some 47 years later, I was astonished to discover that the bases were still exactly the same with some minor changes, but essentially the same as they were prior to reversion of Okinawa. I had assumed, obviously incorrectly, and I think those working with me on the issue assumed that when Okinawa reverted to Japan, it would become part of the process of the gradual diminution and closing of military base and joint use of military base that was already taking place on the mainland of Japan, as we called it, and continued to go forward there after reversion. That did not happen.

And, of course, Secretary Perry was asked the question this morning in a different form. I think the answer has to do with the political realities of Japan, on which I’m sure many of you are much more familiar than I am, but clearly to put it mildly, the Japanese government has since the time of reversion attached much less priority to reducing the size of bases and the military footprint in Japan proper as it has done to Okinawa. I think there are lots of reasons for that, but I think that is the reality of the situation.

Now, on the question of whether you could perform the military tasks without the bases in Japan or without some of them. I think the answer to that question is the military will always say it is impossible, and it will always turn out to be possible to do so with some cost, and perhaps some overall degradation, but usually not any overall degradation.

And I think the history of the American military attitude toward Okinawa is very revealing of the situation. In 1966 the attitude, as I said, of the American military was we would retain Okinawa for the foreseeable future. And if you asked whether that was just convenient or necessary, the answer was it was absolutely necessary, that the functions that we performed at Okinawa could not be performed any place else and could not be performed on Okinawa if Okinawa was subject to the same rules of engagement as the Japanese mainland. That was 1966. In 1967 and again in 1969 the American military agreed to a position presented to President Johnson and to President Nixon that Okinawa reversion was possible under the same rules of operation of military bases as the mainland of Japan, and --somebody’s already revealed the fact that there were nuclear weapons on Okinawa, so I will cite that source from the

11 He says “less” but it seems his intent is to explain that Japan was more focused on reducing the footprint in Japan proper than in Okinawa
audience—and that it would be possible to remove the nuclear weapons that were on Okinawa from Okinawa as part of those arrangements.

And that was because the American military became aware of the fact that there was a risk to the alliance if Okinawa was not returned, and clearly thought that maintaining the bases on the mainland was much more important than maintaining special rights for the bases on Okinawa.

And the situation will change in terms of the American attitude towards the current bases in Okinawa only when and if the American government becomes persuaded that not doing so risks the alliance. And as long as the Japanese government continues to say that it can move the base, can relocate the base and is prepared to do so, the government – the attitude of the American government will not change. Let me stop there and obviously take questions.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much, Dr. Halperin. Our next speaker is Professor Fumiaki Nozoe who is a professor at Okinawa International University. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Hitotsubashi University and he is one of the rising stars on the history of U.S.-Japan security relations. Just the past couple of years he has published two very important books in Japanese, one entitled *The Japan-U.S. Security Alliance After the Return of Okinawa in 1972*, which won the Inoki Masamichi award, and another book entitled *Okinawa and the U.S. Marine Corps, the Historical Progress of the Marine Presence on Okinawa*. Professor Nozoe.

DR. NOZOE: Thank you for the introduction, and good afternoon, everyone. I am Fumiaki Nozoe, it is my great honor to participate in this conference. Today I would like to talk about the U.S.-Japan Alliance from Okinawa’s point of view. As you know, the U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of the Asia-Pacific Region’s peace, prosperity and freedom. In the increasing severe international security environment in East Asia, the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance is growing. However, I would like to stress that any alliance is not sustainable, and any base is not operationally viable, without the local understanding of the local community.

I believe that Secretary Perry and Dr. Halperin understand this point when they managed the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 1960s and 1990s. And Okinawa is an important but very vulnerable place in the U.S.-Japan Alliance because Okinawa hosts 70 percent of the U.S. military presence in Japan. In military terms, as many experts suggest, the U.S. bases on Okinawa have become increasingly vulnerable to Chinese and North Korean missile capabilities. The concentration of the U.S. bases on Okinawa is strategically dangerous. In political terms the huge U.S. military presence has caused many troubles and fueled outrage in Okinawa.

According to an opinion poll in Okinawa by NHK in 2017, 65 percent supported for the U.S.-Japan Alliance; however, the 48 percent opposed the U.S. military bases where just 44 percent accepted this. In addition, 70 percent thought that the stationing of huge U.S. military bases was discrimination against
Okinawa by Japan and the United States, and about 80 percent in Okinawa hoped for a drastic reduction of the U.S. military base. As you know, the most controversial issue is the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station to Henoko, Nago City. According to a poll in NHK, 60 percent in Okinawa still oppose the relocation of Futenma Base to Henoko or the construction of the replacement facility at Henoko by the Japanese government is proceeding.

In the Nago mayoral election in this February, Taketoyo Toguchi backed by the Japanese government won against former Mayor Susumu Inamine who opposed the relocation; however, I’d like to stress that the victory of Toguchi does not mean the relocation is accepted by local citizens in Nago City. According to the poll, 63 percent are opposed to relocation. The Komeito party supported for Toguchi in this election. Komeito’s Okinawa branch have been against the relocation; therefore, the new mayor did not declare his policy on this relocation plan in the election until now.

In this context it is not easy for the Japanese government to implement the relocation plan. If the Japanese government continues the construction of the new facility in Henoko forcibly, it could intensify resistance in Okinawa to all U.S. military bases, including highly important Kadena Air Base. Such a movement could damage the foundation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In this context we have to review the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa, because the U.S. Marine Corps occupies 70 percent of the U.S. military bases and 60 percent of the U.S. military force in Okinawa. Also, I understand the U.S. Marine Corps contributes to security and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region, but the stationing of Marines have been a burden on Okinawa.

I would like to point out that the cause for the withdrawal and the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps out of Okinawa or from Okinawa are growing recently against recent repeated incidents and troubles by the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa. The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly unanimously passed a resolution for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps out of Okinawa last November and this February. The new Nago City mayor, Taketoyo Toguchi, also pledged his support for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps out of Okinawa in the election in order to get the support from Komeito and the many local citizens in Nago City. We should pay attention to such movements.

From a historical point of view, Okinawa has not been the militarily the ideal place for the U.S. Marine Corps. When the U.S. Marine Corps came to Japan in 1953 in order to support the U.S. operations in the Korean War for the first time after World War II, they were deployed in Yamanashi, Gifu, and Nara, not in Okinawa because these areas were geographically closer to the Korean Peninsula than Okinawa, as Professor Mochizuki suggested. However, the rise of the anti-U.S. Base movement in Japan made the Marine Corps move to Okinawa from 1955 to 1957. And because Okinawa was under U.S. military control at that time, the U.S. Marine Corps could use Okinawa freely and expanded their base there.

According to the U.S. diplomatic records; however, the U.S. diplomatic and the military officials expressed doubt from military viewpoint on moving Marines to Okinawa at that time. They argued that because the Marines were a mobile force, they could be somewhere else. According to Dr. Akiko
Yamamoto, the Department of Defense considered relocation of Marines from Japan to Guam during that process. However, the Japanese government asked the U.S. government for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from the main islands of Japan, they did not oppose the redeployment of the Marines on Okinawa.

In 1972 the administrative rights of Okinawa was returned from the United States to Japan. My archival research have demonstrated that the U.S. government thought it might be politically difficult to maintain U.S. military presence on Okinawa after the reversion.

That point that maybe Dr. Halperin suggested, therefore, the U.S. officials seriously considered the withdrawals of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Tinian, California, and South Korea from 1972 to 1973. However, the Japanese government asked the U.S. government to keep the U.S. Marine Corps on Okinawa because they regard the U.S. Marine Corps on Okinawa as the most tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to defense for Japan. Thus, the U.S. government decided to keep the U.S. Marines on Okinawa.

This historical episode shows that the Japanese government has placed a premium on the stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa, while the presence of the Marine Corps Marines on Okinawa has not been the only option for the U.S. military strategy. Recently tensions over the Senkaku Islands between Japan and China are rising. And many Japanese people are expecting that the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa would fight against China for defense of Senkaku Islands; however, the guidelines for the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in 2015 says the Self Defense Forces will have a primary responsibility to defend these islands, including operations to retake these islands, and the U.S. forces will support and supplement the Self Defense Forces operation. Actually, the Ground Self Defense Force set up the amphibious rapid deployment brigade this March.

Despite these facts, the construction of the new facility at Henoko will increase the expectation of the Japanese people and the U.S. Marines will fight against China for the defense of Senkaku Islands and will provoke neighboring countries in a military conflict over the Senkaku Islands, even though deterrence is important. But the construction of the new facility in Henoko could escalate the tension. Okinawan people don’t – don’t hope such a scenario.

In order to make the U.S.-Japan Alliance sustainable, I believe that the two governments should reassess the present relocation plan and the U.S. military presence drastically. I personally think that we should explore the relocation of the bases in Okinawa to main islands of Japan and promoting the joint and the shared U.S. bases in Japan between the U.S. force and the Self Defense Forces.

Moreover, although the U.S. and Japanese governments have repeated the relocation of the Futenma Base to Henoko is the only solution, and the Japanese government have stuck to the stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps on Okinawa, some alternatives have been proposed by experts, including Professor
Mochizuki and Kyoji Yanagisawa, the former Assistant Chief of the Cabinet Secretary of the Japanese government, and Tomohiro Yara the Okinawa journalist. They pay attention on the fact that the U.S. Marines on Okinawa don’t have the means of transportation because the amphibious ship that they use is deployed at Sasebo in Nagasaki Prefecture, not in Okinawa. They argue that there is no need to construct a replacement facility at Henoko for the closure of Futenma Base without operational problems by implementing the readjustment of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa, and promoting the U.S.-Japan security cooperation. We need to examine these alternatives seriously.

Finally, the geographic location of Okinawa is strategically important in East Asia. For that reason, I believe that the political, social and economic stability in Okinawa is critical. Therefore, addressing the Okinawa base problem is a key test for the sustainability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the international order led by the United States into changing the international security environment. Thank you.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much, Professor Nozoe. And our final speaker on this panel for the first round is Dr. Eric Heginbotham, who is now a principal research scientist at MIT Center for International Studies. And he received his Ph.D. in political science from MIT. Before going back to MIT, he was senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation in which he led a variety of very important projects on China, Japan and regional security issues. And he was a lead author of two recent Rand reports, one, China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, and the other one, the frequently cited study, U.S.-China Military Scorecard.

Dr. Heginbotham is not only a specialist of Chinese military affairs, but also Japanese military strategy. He is fluent in both Chinese and Japanese, and his English is very good as well. And he is someone that I always turn to for expertise on East Asian security issues and military strategy. Dr. Heginbotham.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Thanks very much for that kind introduction, Mike. I’m honored to be here amongst so many august people, and I know I for one have learned a lot today. I absolutely appreciate all of the problems and challenges that the bases in Okinawa pose to the people there and to the politics. I was assigned though the task of talking about strategic issues, and so I’ll stick to that fairly narrowly. I’ll just make four basic points on the security equation, and, you know, we can follow up on those during the equation and entering the discussion and maybe bring these various strands together.

But the first point I’d make is that Japan’s security situation is arguably more challenging than at any point during the post-World War II period. Second point is that Okinawa is more relevant to many of those challenges than it was to the defense of Japan during the Cold War or the defense of other areas in East Asia. Third, it will likely be necessary, as Professor Nozoe suggested, for the alliance to reconsider its military strategy in light of evolving military technologies, and we see that to a certain extent that’s already happening. And fourth, the adjustments to strategy will have implications for the nature, location and size of the military presence on Okinawa. And I’ll focus my comments on China. I’m quite pleased that Dr. Perry addressed the Korea aspects of the challenge or the regional environment in such detail.
Before diving into those points though, I just want to stipulate up front that neither China nor Japan in my view would ever deliberately start a war with each other, not would the United States. So on that point, I’m fully in agreement with Dr. Perry and most sinologists, but there is the possibility that a clash could occur and that neither side would find it easy to retreat from their positions. In that context then, the military balance may influence the extent to which the various actors might accept risk, both before and during and after a clash.

So, I’m going to talk about military operations around Okinawa, but again I want to stress that that’s not the expected outcome. On my first point, the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region is shifting with dramatic speed. Growth in China’s military spending has tracked closely with the growth of the Chinese economy. Since 1996 when we had the Taiwan Straits Crisis and also in when the SACO agreement was finalized, Chinese military spending has grown by an inflation-adjusted average of ten percent per year or thereabouts. That’s slowed down somewhat in recent years, but another eight percent increase was approved this month.

So, in aggregate, China’s defense budget has grown by an inflation adjusted 720 percent since 1996, so we’re really in a different kind of world than we were when the Taiwan Straits Crisis happened. We’ve heard a fair bit in recent years and months about the fact that Japanese military spending is now beginning to grow again. The cabinet approved a 1.3 percent increase in the self-defense budget in December. But, again, we need to keep this in perspective. In 1996 Japan’s defense budget was about twice that of China, today it’s significantly less than a third, it’s going on about a quarter of China’s defense spending.

Now, spending, of course, is only the inputs. What are the outputs? China’s military capabilities don’t yet reflect the full scope of its expenditures. Weapons stocks take years and decades to develop, and Japan continues to maintain a lead in a number of areas; it has some of the best war ships, it has the best navy in the region. But, again, the trend lines are quite clear. China already has advantages in some areas and more and more types of equipment are reaching a serious production and being pumped out of Chinese factories.

So just to review the bidding in some of these areas, China today has more than 1,300 very accurate conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, some of those now have the range to reach Guam. It has an unknown but probably equal number of long-range cruise missiles. The missiles are part of what people have termed an anti-access area denial capability, but China is also no longer really a one-trick pony and it’s developed quite a force of conventional maneuver forces as well. It operates about 850 modern fourth generation fighters, and that’s against roughly 300 fourth generation fighters that Japan operates. And its navy, which was once a primarily frigate force is now in serious production of destroyers. It’s going to commission five new large destroyers this year, which is a faster rate of production than the United States is pursuing.

Okay. Turning to my second major point, Okinawa is now central to the military equation in East Asia. And we could talk about its proximity to various potential conflict points. I’ll just talk about its immediate
relevancy to a Senkaku Islands clash or dispute, but the same things could be said with regard to its proximity to Taiwan, which is not far from the Senkakus. Naha, Kadena and Futemma are the only three U.S. and Japanese Air Bases within unrefueled fighter range of the Senkakus. Unrefueled fighter range is about a thousand kilometers, and the distance from Okinawa to the Senkakus, or the main Okinawan island to the Senkakus is just over 400 kilometers. In contrast, China has about 29 military air bases within unrefueled range of that area. So, it can, at least in principle, get more aircraft there, and its response times could be shorter. U.S. and Japanese aircraft can, of course, use tankers to fly for more distant areas, but again transit times would be longer, and response times slower. Some of these bases like Yokota are more than 2,000 kilometers from the Senkakus.

All right. My third point, it’s increasingly necessary for the United States and Japan to adjust military strategy, and again we see some indications of this. In my own view, a strong case could be made for transitioning to what might be called the denial strategy, a more defensive strategy, which would take greater advantage of distance, time, mobility and the inherent advantages of defense. Not only would this be, I think, a more robust defense and a more affordable defense, but also this would buttress, I think, crisis stability as well. I won’t get into the finer points of that debate over strategy, but I do want to stress that most – or at least many military analysts now agree on at least some of the adjustments that will be necessary. In response to the vulnerability of bases and other fixed assets, the alliance is looking to improve what military officers call operational resilience.

Operational resilience is the ability of a force to sustain attack and continue to function effectively, and it can be achieved through a variety of measures: active defenses, hardening, dispersion and mobility. Active defense would include air and missile defenses, these SAM batteries, Surface to Air Missile batteries and missile defense batteries, and this is probably what most people think of when they imagine a response to the missile threat. But missile defenses, unfortunately, are extraordinarily expensive, probably more expensive than the missiles they’re designed to shoot down, and they’re not always terribly effective. So, they’re certainly not the only answer.

The hardening of bases involves the construction of concrete shelters for aircraft and the protection of critical stores like fuel, munitions and command facilities, et cetera. The dispersion of forces is also critical. Aircraft, for example, can be dispersed within an air base if there’s sufficient space for that, and if there are few enough aircraft on the base. They can also be dispersed to a larger number of air bases and runways within the Japanese archipelago, assuming they have access to those air bases or air strips, and these could, of course, include civilian dual-use facilities. Dispersion could also see forces deployed at greater distances from China. For example, they might be deployed to Guam or other islands in the Marianas at the outset of a conflict, and then perhaps moved back in.

And then finally mobility, concealment and deception may also be elements of operational resiliency, and we see a bunch of new concepts being explored by, for example, the U.S. Air Force, which in many ways is really taking a page from the Marines’ playbook. But there’s a new concept that the Air Force calls ACE, Agile Combat Employment, and they’re experimenting with taking small groups of aircraft, four
fighters and one C-17 to austere bases operating for 24 or 36 hours and then coming back to a main operating base.

Okay. Finally, I’ll turn to the issue of what the implications are for U.S. and Japanese military presence in Okinawa. And the question here is, you know, does all of this mean that bases are less important? They’re more vulnerable, so does this mean we should be pulling out of Okinawa? And my short answer is, no, but my longer answer is, you know, adjustments are certainly in order.

So, in my view, the ideal adjustments, and, again, these are only my own views of this, but in my view three adjustments might be in order. First, air and air defense and missile defense components should, in fact, be reinforced through the Ryukyus. The Self-Defense Forces have already done some of this. The SDF has moved a small battery of surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship missiles, one battery of each, to each of three different islands, Amami Oshima, which is just off Kyushu, Kagoshima, Miyako Island, which is just south of the island of Okinawa, and Ishigaki which is down at the end of the island chain near Taiwan. It’s also placed a radar on Yonaguni, which is really at the tip just off of Taiwan. And it’s increased its air presence at Naha from one fighter squadron to two, bringing the total number of fighters to 40. Some additional deployments may be in order.

They’re talking about bringing anti-ship missiles to the main island of Okinawa. And if one thinks about it, you know, should a conflict occur, and what we’re really looking at here is the ability to deter such conflict. But should a conflict occur, you know, three batteries of anti-ship missiles and three batteries of anti-aircraft missiles are unlikely to do the trick. But forces can be flown into the theater, and my recommendation or my thought about a second adjustment would be the further improvement of military infrastructure so that, you know, if some incident should occur, forces can flow into the theater. And, again, we see some of this already going on.

In an ideal world there would be more operating locations for aircraft, so there would be dual-use airports open, perhaps in Miyako or Ishigaki, so that there would be more locations from which aircraft could operate. To be sure in an air and missile scenario, bases throughout Japan would be vulnerable to missile attack, but Chinese missile numbers and capabilities are not unlimited. So, the more of these bases that you have available to you and the more of these bases that you can operate from, the harder it would be for China or an adversary to shut them down, and the less incentive an adversary would have to try. Bases would be hardened and harbor and communication infrastructure throughout the Ryukyus, again, would be further improved. And, again, we see a lot of this going on.

And then finally, the military forces capable of movement and capable of actually executing this kind of shift down into the Ryukyus would be enhanced and, you know, again, all three of these we see happening to some extent. After decades of every-increasing ship sizes, Japan for the first time is downsizing its next tranche of ships and they’re producing eight destroyers that are more like frigate class size and can operate from some of the harbors in the Ryuku chain. Air packages could be made more expeditionary. Japan is studying the acquisition of F-35B fighters, that’s the short takeoff and vertical
landing variant of the F-35, and these could be deployed on the Osumi-class ships, but also on the islands themselves on shorter, more austere runways.

So, in conclusion, I’d say that from a defense perspective, Okinawa is more important than ever. Units there no longer are simply marking time or stationed there for more distant contingencies, or at least that’s not their only function. They contribute directly to the immediate defense of Okinawa. From Okinawa’s perspective, this is – you know, may be unfortunate. If it’s any consolation, diplomacy and deterrence worked during the Cold War when West Germany and Hokkaido were on the front line, and with some creative thinking, there’s no reason to think this won’t work today in East Asia where the situation is far less dire than it ever was during the Cold War. Thanks.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much. So before opening up to the floor, I wanted to ask all of the panelists to see if they have any comments on the points made by the other panelists. But I just wanted to flag one issue, and this is the issue of risk that I think came up in all three sets of remarks. And, you know, one is the political risk to the alliance, and how severe one sees the political risk to the alliance, and as Professor Nozoe referred to the vulnerability that the U.S. military presence, as currently constituted, poses for the U.S.-Japan alliance. And then there’s, of course, the military risk, the increasing challenges that Japan and the United States faces. It’s very different from the time that Secretary Perry served in the Clinton Cabinet, so it’s definitely gotten severe.

So the question is, you know, how does one manage the political risk versus the military risk? And if, indeed, you know, as the Japanese government likes to say, is it – you know, given these risks, the current realignment plan, is that the only and best solution, or to put it more modestly, is it still the least bad solution? So I wanted to ask Mort, given your long service in government and the opposition that you faced regarding the reversion of Okinawa, I mean, how do you think that the U.S. government will think about the political risk versus the military risks and challenges, and do you have any suggestions that you could give to perhaps the Japanese or Governor Onaga about how to move beyond the current stalemate that we seem to be in?

DR. HALPERIN: It’s a very difficult situation. I think what we had in the 60s when we were confronting reversion was a strong commitment, as I think there still is, on both sides to the maintenance of the alliance. But we also had people in the U.S. government who were willing to look with sympathy at the political situation in Japan and to reach the conclusion that the United States was running a significant risk to the alliance, to the bases in Japan, if it did not make some move on Okinawa.

And the scenario that those of us who were making this argument painted, went back to the 1960 riots in Japan, and what we suggested was that there was a risk that there would be comparable outbreak of anti-American, anti-alliance activity, which would have two unfortunate consequences. One, it would reveal to both sides the fragility of the alliance, and perhaps encourage those in Japan who thought they had a chance of actually ending the alliance. But second, we would be forced to make changes in the base structure that would be seen by everybody to be the result of opposition pressure rather than our own decisions.
And so what we persuaded the American government was that if you balance those risks, you wanted to move when you could say we were doing this to strengthen the alliance; we’re doing this on the basis of an agreement between the people in both governments who care deeply about maintaining the alliance, rather than under pressure from a political movement, at least some of whose members wanted to end the alliance and were pressing to do so.

Now, that required trust between the U.S. government and the Japanese government because the Japanese government’s greatest fear was that it would make a demand on the return of Okinawa, and then it would not – the U.S. would not respond. Or in the later stages the U.S. would respond but say, but we have to keep the nuclear weapons there, and then the agreement would fall apart and the Japanese government would be left exposed to having said, we can’t tolerate the continued occupation of Okinawa, and then have to do so, and it would then encourage the forces who were trying to drive the alliance apart.

And I think the same situation is here now, but I think we’re lacking in both the U.S. government and the Japanese government, the people and forces that are needed to make this work. There has to be some people in Japan who say to the U.S. government, this is too risky, we’ve been doing this now for, what is it – how many years is it since the base was announced –

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Twenty-two years.

DR. HALPERIN: And it’s time to say that Japan as a democracy cannot deliver on that, and the U.S. side has to say, we appreciate, we understand the efforts that have been made, we will now work with you to find a different solution. And once you start looking, once you get over this notion that there is no option, then you find that there are lots of options and they have different amounts of degradation, and the degradations can be overcome.

The question we always asked was, what are the things we do now on Okinawa and could we continue to do them under mainland rules and how much degradation would be if we did them under mainland rules? And if we had to move them off Okinawa, where else could we put them and how much degradation would there be? And then you had to weigh that against the threat to the alliance of just saying, no. And I think we need to do the same thing now. I don’t see any sign – and I did, I have to say, in previous American administrations, any willingness to do that. When you had a Japanese government that was trying to do that, it was, in my view, unfortunately stonewalled by the American administration.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Well, I want to turn to both Professor Nozoe and Eric Heginbotham on this point about possible alternatives. And, you know, I think looking at it from the viewpoint of people who played a key role in first the discussions that led to the SACO Report in 1996, and then the 2005 agreement based on the Defense Policy Review Initiative, the DPR Initiative, I think they would think that that’s
exactly what they were doing, that they were seeing the potential risks in the future and, therefore, they came up with a plan that would reduce the burden on Okinawa while maintaining the critical operational requirements. But Professor Nozoe, I think what you were saying is that in the eyes of the people of Okinawa, that this was not enough. That even if the Henoko plan went through and Futenma was closed, that this would not lead to kind of stabilization of the situation in Okinawa, that there will still be risks.

So, I guess why do you feel that there are those risks and what kind of realistic options do you think there are, and what kinds of options might be emerging from Japan or Okinawa?

DR. NOZOE: Thank you. The first point, I would like to point to three points. Firstly, still majority of Okinawan people have been – have opposed the relocation plan because they feel – they have felt that the relocation plan is not a real reduction of the burden but strengthening of the burden. Maybe there are many officials of the U.S. government and the Japanese government denied this, but I think the feeling of Okinawan people is more important. So, I think that we have to pay attention to the fact that the majority of Okinawan people have resisted the relocation plan, that we have to see this point.

The second point is that now the Okinawan people’s resistance focuses on the relocation of Futenma Air Force to Henoko, not all U.S. bases in Okinawa. And Dr. Heginbotham pointed out, that point is very important, but now the problem is the Futenma Air Base and the U.S. Marine Corps, so if we ignored this Okinawan people’s feeling, I’m afraid that the Okinawan people’s resistance spread from just the Marine Corps to the all U.S. bases in Okinawa, including the more highly important Kadena Air Base. That is – I’d like to point out. Thank you.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you. And, Eric, just addressing the same question, you referred to the notion of operational resilience and, you know, certainly active defense, and especially through ballistic missile defense, and hardening is one way of going, and that’s being done. But then there’s also the issue of dispersion and mobility. If U.S. defense planners and Japanese defense planners were to work – focus much more on the dispersion and mobility side, do you see opportunities that might go beyond DPRI, you know, that would make U.S. military kind of operational resilience more effective and more efficient, but then at the same time have the payoff of reducing further the burden on Okinawa?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: So, you know, as you stipulated up front, the issue is balancing operational risk and political risk, and, you know, can you do that and still strengthen the alliance’s military capabilities. And I think if you approach this, you know, from a blank slate, and if there were political commitment on both sides, yes, you could probably – you could probably reduce both forms of risk and you could improve operational resiliency and lower the – in a number of ways, anyway, lower the political risk.

So, you know, at one point, certainly Japan and the United States, to a certain extent, pursued sort of a forward defense sort of static approach to its defense facilities. We were operating from very large, fixed main operating bases. We could probably move away from that model. There are questions about whether
the Marines have to be there, and I think we’ve already talked about that quite a bit today, but in my view, no, they don’t have to be there. The question I think, at least from the U.S. military perspective, becomes as maybe a third type of risk or a different type of political risk, which is if they make an agreement, you know, will it be honored.

And, you know, that’s not just a question of Japan’s commitment to honoring its agreement, it’s really the political continuity and the continuity of the commitment by both national governments as well as Okinawa and how these things fit with evolving strategic – the evolving strategic environment. So, I think there’s sort of a risk aversion from the standpoint of the U.S. military that if it agrees to certain things, some of those may not be executed upon.

But as far as some specifics, you know, again, I could imagine something that goes beyond S ACO as far as the scale of our presence. But there are other things written into the guidelines, the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, as they already exist about the opening of civilian infrastructure and the increased use of dual-use facilities so that you can actually execute this kind of mobile strategy where your forces don’t have to be in Okinawa, but they can flow to Okinawa. But, you know, a lot of those agreements haven’t really been fully implemented, there have only been site surveys of a few civilian airports. It’s not a hard task. It just hasn’t been done. There are a lot of bureaucratic obstacles.

So, if that could be done, and if you actually exercise this capability, and if folks had confidence that those facilities would actually be available in a crisis, I think, yes, absolutely.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Okay. Well, I’d like to open the floor to questions. So, Andrew?

DR. YEO: Thank you. Andrew Yeo, Catholic University. I wanted to ask something based on Dr. Heginbotham’s talk, but I think this could be answered by anyone on the panel. You had mentioned a changing alliance strategy for the U.S. and Japan, and you know, as we move forward, you know, I’m thinking – let’s say that there is a strategic answer to a Futenma replacement somewhere in mainland Japan. So let’s assume that those requirements are sufficiently met, if we move to the political arena, I mean, how likely is it that the government of Japan would be – how likely would the government of Japan be willing to endorse such a plan?

And I’m curious because right now there might be a window of opportunity with increased threats and with the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Under these conditions, would the Japanese government be willing to, again, put more capital – political capital into, you know, serving or looking for potential replacement sites in mainland Japan? Thanks.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: So actually I think that’s probably more a question for Professor Nozoe, since it has to do with political willingness on the part of Japan, but, yeah, I mean, I think we’re talking about a
relocation of one base, but, again, I guess I would emphasize the need for more bases or at least access to more points, right, and more facilities. And I don’t see a whole lot of willingness yet to do that, but I think you’re right, there’s an opportunity here, people’s awareness in Japan of the threat has certainly been highlighted by Korea. So, you know, in my view there should be an opportunity.

DR. NOZOE: Now, the Prime Minister Abe is very hard to implement the relocation plan to Henoko. In the Diet, Prime Minister Abe said they have sought other options, but politically Henoko is our best option, so he decided to implement the relocation. He said so. So, his remarks sparked outrage -fueled outrage in Okinawa, this is discrimination. Many Japanese official repeatedly say that not the military reason, but the political reason is the relocation of Futenma to Henoko. So, I don’t know, political or military perspective, but the political reason is the relocation of Futenma to Henoko inside of Okinawa is a very increased discontent of Okinawa right now.

DR. HALPERIN: And I mean, I think there is in both Japan and the United States a feeling that they made this deal and that somehow they have to keep the deal. That if we give in, say we’ll give you another option, it shows a weakening of the alliance or a weakening of the commitment to the alliance.

So, each country is waiting for the other say – either for Japan to say, we just can’t deliver on it or for the United States to say, now there’s a changing military environment. And that seems to me the much better basis to do this, the two governments should come together and say, in light of the changing Chinese threat and in light of the growing North Korean threat, we’ve reevaluated what we need and what’s much more important is the concept of joint bases and the use of civilian bases. So, every Japanese military base in Japan should, in principle, be open to American military forces. That, as I understand it, is not the case now, and I don’t really understand that. And that in the context of that, they could say the resources that are available, which are never as much as you want, are better used to create this jointness and this flexibility to use civilian bases than to build this runway out in the middle of this beautiful water.

Those of you who have not seen it, I urge you to go. If you’re an environmentalist, you’ll have a different perspective on what this all about. But clearly we can say, look, many years have passed since we made this political decision that this was the best alternative. We now face a very different Chinese threat, a very different North Korean threat, other things are much more urgent and resources should go to them and we should change from this plan. Not because Japan is forcing the United States to give up or the United States is doubting Japanese ability to deliver, but because we’re in a new situation. I think that would be in the security interest of both sides.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: And I think one of the issues is probably in the Japanese government, there is a tendency to tolerate more risks and political costs in Okinawa rather than on any kinds of options on the main islands. Okay. Professor Rabson.
PROFESSOR RABSON: I’m Steve Rabson, and as I mentioned this morning, I was stationed in Henoko at the ordnance depot there before reversion when it stored nuclear weapons. I have a question for Dr. Halperin. Quite a bit of controversy was stirred in Japan in the last few weeks by a statement attributed to Mr. Akiba Takeo, who is a high foreign ministry official. The statement was quoted in an article published by the Association of Concerned Scientists, I think they’re here today, and it was based supposedly on a memo of February 27th 2009 entitled, Discussion with Japanese Political Counselor, Akiba Takeo.

Now, from what I understand, this memo is based on notes that was taken by someone who was present at the meeting. I’m not going to ask you who that person was, I’m just going to ask you, do you have confidence in the person’s professional skills and competence to do this job, and also do you doubt in any way the accuracy of the summary of the notes that were taken and the resulting article that was published?

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Before I have Dr. Halperin answer that question, for those that do not know what Professor Rabson is referring to, is a Congressional mandated commission called America’s Strategic Posture, I believe. And Secretary Perry was the chairman of that commission and James Schlesinger was the co-chairman, and I believe, Dr. Halperin, you were a member of that commission.

DR. HALPERIN: Yes, you should have asked Dr. Perry that question, because he was, in fact, the chair of that commission. I have no basis on which to challenge the accuracy of the material that has been released, nor any reason to question the competence and integrity of the people involved in the drafting of it.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: So obviously I wasn’t there, but I think the notes referred to Japan’s desire to see a, you know, flexible U.S. nuclear force posture with strong hints that there was a desire for the U.S. to maintain a tactical nuclear capability. And, you know, obviously, again, can’t speak to that particular event, but Kono Taro came out immediately after the United States released its new nuclear posture review and said he very much appreciated the content of that nuclear posture review, and that the NPR – the new NPR is a return to at least bring back parts of our tactical nuclear war fighting capability. So, there is a certain type of consistency there, I think, over time in Japan’s view.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Well, Dr. Halperin, if I could just follow up on that. I mean, you’ve written eloquently for many years on the whole issue of nuclear deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence. You know, given the changing military balance, you know, how critical do you feel is tactical nuclear weapons for maintaining the robustness of extended nuclear deterrence in the region?

DR. HALPERIN: I think they’re irrelevant. I’ve always thought so and continue to believe so. The issue was, as was said, whether the Japanese government would agree that the U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan could be effectively implemented without the development and the maintenance of tactical nuclear weapons that might be brought back into the European theater.
And, of course, the Japanese government has always had this contradictory position. On the one hand, many people in the Japanese government thought some presence of tactical nuclear weapons in the theater was important, on the other hand, the Japanese government made it clear that it could not tolerate the presence of American nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. And I think that was true in Europe as well where there were many – some Europeans who thought tactical nuclear weapons were necessary and others who thought they were unacceptable.

My view is that the credibility of the nuclear deterrent in any situation has to do with the alliance relationship, with the confidence of the people being defended that the United States will honor its security commitments and not whether nuclear weapons will be used initially, which I do not think they should be, nor where they are located. And we’re playing that out now in the Korean situation as well. And I think it’s much more important that the Korean government and the Korean people understand that the United States has a security commitment to Japan\(^{12}\) which requires it to do whatever is necessary to defend South Korea, and that it will do that regardless of where the nuclear weapons are stationed. That was exactly the issue in Japan, the Japanese government has always been split on the issue, and its public position has always been different than some of its private positions on that question.

I think in that round, which led to the Obama Administration’s position, there was finally, I think, complete agreement that a tactical cruise missile was not necessary, and that’s being reopened again by the same people who had that position at the time. The people and the positions never change, it seems to be – working on nuclear weapons seems to be good for your longevity because people stay in the field for a very long time and never change their views, and I’m equally guilty of that.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: But one other element in the way extended deterrence works, it’s not just the reassurance that allies want, but how the target of extended deterrence sees things. And so, I wanted to ask you, Eric, if you’re looking at it from the Chinese perspective and whether you’re looking at it - at the Senkaku issue or the Taiwan issue, you know, first of all, how important or how significant is having tactical nuclear weapons to shaping the calculations of China. And then when you were talking about the Senkakus you mentioned the importance of access to air fields. And I guess, someone who’s looked at the Senkaku issue and the inherent value of the Senkakus, I just find it mind boggling that China might actually take the risk of seizing the Senkakus so that the United States would need to have access of all of those air fields in order to deter China. So, you’ve been a student of Chinese military thinking, I mean, what’s your take on that?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Right. Those are great questions. They’re both enormous questions. Just briefly on the nuclear side, you know, one can make arguments on the nuclear side about, you know, whether these might be useful in a Korea contingency, but just speaking to China. China has a ‘no first use’ nuclear policy, and unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it’s actually built a force structure that’s consistent with that, it’s quite credible.

\(^{12}\) He says Japan but probably means Korea
Now that force structure is evolving today, but it has abjured some of the capabilities it would need for a war fighting strategy. So it does not maintain tactical nuclear weapons at present, it doesn’t have a launch on warning, in fact, it doesn’t even make, for the most part, its missiles and warheads. So, return to, you know, greater emphasis on actual war fighting, and our deterrent posture I think could push China in ways that are certainly not in our interest as far as, you know, driving them to rethink some of their nuclear calculations about both force structure and potentially about their doctrine. So that’s on the nuclear side.

As far as the Senkakus are concerned, absolutely in agreement with you that they’re not worth a war. I don’t think China would ever calculate that they’re worth a war with the United States. The reason though that I think it’s worth thinking about conflict over the – that springs from the Senkakus and the dispute over the Senkakus is that you can certainly imagine a clash there. You’ve got military assets in close proximity, you’ve got risk-taking behavior, you know, hopefully we can have more discussions with the Chinese and reduce that risk-taking behavior, but now China has more and more assets that it can put farther and farther out from the coast, so you’ve got these assets in close proximity. If something – you know, if a clash occurred, a small clash, maybe sparked by an accident or by, you know, local commanders, there is an issue that, you know, if China were in danger of losing this, it could regain its advantage in a local sense by escalating the conflict.

So, if you have one air base and that’s where the Japanese are operating from in Okinawa, China has all these missiles, you know, they could look to use this capability to prevent Japan from gaining an advantage in that local area. So, I think we want to look at that escalation chain and how – you know, how deterrence plays out within that once you have a conflict you want a posture that doesn’t provide incentives for the Chinese side to escalate the conflict.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Okay. Any other questions from the floor? Yes, Kevin.

MR. MAHER: I hesitate to return to Futenma, but just a word of caution really. For 20, 22 years we’ve been hearing that we need a plan B, we need another plan. And I would just remind everyone as part of my question that, 1997 there was a plan, 2004, 2005, 2009 when the Democratic party came into power under Hatoyama, and then when Abe came back – this has been looked at many times, and many times people say, we need to find a better plan but nobody has a plan. And I would just remind everyone that if you accept the need operationally for a runway for the Marine Corps that’s co-located with the training ranges and the ground forces and the support forces so that they can train together on an integrated basis, that’s why you have to have the helicopters in Okinawa, close so that they can train. Otherwise, the Marines lose their capability as a rapid response force, they’re the only rapid response ground forces we have in the western Pacific are in Okinawa.

But if you accept that, then the question is, how can you reduce the burden by moving the runway? And every time it’s been looked at and every time someone like Hatoyama with the DPJ government who fundamentally opposed, he came up with the idea of just moving it out of Okinawa. Once they look at it,
it all comes back to Camp Schwab at Henoko. So, if anybody has – and for – not just for political reasons, primarily for physical reasons because the need for being integrated and co-located, there’s just nowhere else to move the runway. And it’s not a new base, it’s an existing base.

So my question is, when people propose the two governments getting together, I mean, if you’ve got a concrete proposal, you might get some traction with both governments. But unless you have a concrete proposal, if you have, I’d like to hear it, I think everybody, the governor and others would like to hear it.

My other quick question for Nozoe-san, I was just puzzled why you were surprised to see in the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines that the primary response for defending the Senkakus is the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Of course it’s the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, the fundamental meaning of the alliance is not that the U.S. defends Japan, it’s that Japan and the U.S. defend Japan together. That’s why I think the U.S. side welcomes so much the progress in the last five years under the Abe Administration in terms of building resources, collective self-defense, and a lot of the fundamental things that have taken place. Thank you.

DR. NOZOE: Yeah, I agree with your opinion. But what I’d like to say is that many generally Japanese people regard the U.S. Marines as the important role to the defense of Senkaku Islands. I also agree with you and many Japanese officials and Japanese specialists see that the role of the defense of the Senkaku Islands is Japan’s role. I also think so, but the problem is that many Japanese people and Japanese government also explain publicly that the Marine Corps is important because of defense of Senkaku Islands. That explanation and such attitude leads to the Japanese dependence on the U.S. military commitment to the defense of Senkaku Islands.

MR. MAHER: It’s true the Marines do play an important role in the defense of the Senkakus, it’s not –

DR. NOZOE: But such an explanation and such a viewpoint make Japanese government policy but of course I’m afraid such a problem.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: So, I guess you’re talking about a potential moral hazard problem.

DR. NOZOE: Yes.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Okay. Any other questions? Okay. One last question and then I’ll wrap up.
MR. OKIM: Victor Okim again. A very simple question, very short. To what extent will the Abe’s proposed constitutional amendment affect Okinawa military bases, and then U.S.-Japan relations as well? Just simple question but answer also maybe hopefully simple. But I don’t know.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: And that’s the assumption that there will be a constitutional amendment.

MR. OKIM: Constitutional amendment to what extent that Abe’s proposal of the constitutional amendment affects or impact the U.S. bases in Okinawa?

DR. MOCHIZUKI: And that’s his modest proposal of essentially recognizing the Self-Defense Forces.

MR. OKIM: Whatever you want to take it, but simple question actually.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Sure. I can’t speak to that specific question, I think it would have a marginal effect. But there’s a larger trend here which is, as I think Mike put it, I’m not sure whether it was during the break or not, you know, we have this movement towards a real alliance, and that’s got tremendous and profound implications for how we think about a basing and force posture on Okinawa Island and through the Ryukyus, you know, we really do have this potential for joint basing. Most of our bases now are joint.

The SDF is very keen to engage and participate in joint basing. We don’t have combined command, but we have coordination, and the coordination centers are now being built together underground so, you know, we’re making real progress. We have air training relocation and ATR programs, so units are moving around, U.S. air units move out to Japanese bases and train, and I think, you know, we can do more and more of this. You know, again, the key piece that’s missing here is I think the use of civilian bases and maybe institutionalizing some of this in new ways, so ATR, Air Training Relocation is done in the framework of noise mitigation, even though it’s really training and movement and familiarization.

So, we could go farther with this, and to the extent we do, you know, I think this opens up new vistas and new opportunities.

DR. HALPERIN: I think all of this is valuable if it is done in the context of the Japanese government continuing to recognize the concerns in the rest of Asia stemming from the legacy of past Japanese behavior. The most important thing in my view is to actually get an alliance of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States. And what’s lacking in that is the willingness of those two countries, not the United States, the United States would like to see that, and I think also Japan putting to rest all of what remains of the concerns about the period of the Second World War I think it’s moved very far in that direction. I think there are still some more things to be done.
I think the problem with the constitutional change, I think it would have no effect at all. I think Japan has ignored what its constitution said for a very long time. And, you know, it used to have Self-Defense Forces and now a defense ministry. It’s gradually changed since – so I think if the constitution was amended, it would make no difference. What I think it would do in the current context is to further split the Japanese people, and it is very difficult to maintain effective alliances when a substantial portion of your people think it is unacceptable, inappropriate to do so.

So, I think Japan has to build its relationships with its own people and with its neighbors, and when it does that, the amending of the constitution will become relevant but also easy to do if Japan wants to do it. To do it in the absence of that I think is to run risks for no reasons. Because there’s no effective limit on what Japan can do that it needs to amend the constitution to be able to do.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Professor Nozoe.

DR. NOZOE: Yeah, I think that – I don’t think that amendment of the constitution affects the Okinawa base problem. I think that is a problem because in 1950s a Japanese politician thought they should amend the constitution in order to be independent – more independent from United States and in order to reduce military presence. But now the - maybe Prime Minister Abe maybe thinks that keeping the U.S. military presence, particularly in Okinawa, so Japan’s Self-Defense Forces should be built up – in this situation maybe many Okinawan people think that the result of reducing the base burden, the Self-Defense Forces will – more problem, so I think that is a very big problem. So, I hope at least some politician thinks that if Japan build up the military force, in expanse of that, the Okinawa U.S. military base should be decreased.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Okay. Before I just give a couple of – make a couple of points as a wrap up, I want to take this opportunity to thank all of the panelists, Dr. Halperin, Professor Nozoe and Dr. Heginbotham for their excellent insights into this very complex issue. So please join me in thanking them. And I also want to thank Governor Onaga and Secretary Perry and Professor Yeo for their participation in the morning part of the program. So please join me in thanking them.

Now, I just do not have the ability to wrap up in a single fashion all of the many insights, but also very important questions that were raised in this conference. I guess I would just leave with a couple of thoughts. One, looking at it from the Okinawa perspective, I think what many of those who were speaking on behalf of the voices in Okinawa was basically telling us that there are enormous risks still at play regarding the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, it’s the political risks. And as I think about the future schedule about the construction of the Futenma replacement facility, much less the whole issue of when Futenma will be returned. You know, it could be another decade or even more before Futenma is returned, and one of the things that we have to be aware of is if there is an accident, the explosive effect that such an accident may have on the people of Okinawa.
I think the other message, and I think this is probably a message to the people of Okinawa, and I think it was articulated very nicely by Professor Yeo, is that if Okinawa wants to move the needle on this discussion it needs to engage the security consensus that exists between the United States and Japan, and what’s happened is that this consensus has tightened rather than loosened over time. I mean, I probably do agree with Keven Maher that, given the assumptions that Mr. Maher was making, probably there is no other plan that is better than the one that currently exists, but I think what may be called for is to move beyond those assumptions and think about some kind of paradigm shift.

And so, if this conversation is to continue in a more productive fashion, I think it’s much more important for then the voices of Okinawa to link up with the security policy community in both the United States and Japan. So, thank you very much for attending this conference and for your attention and for your questions.

And I want to thank, again, Governor Onaga and Okinawa Prefectural Government. And I was just reminded that please return your translation devices in a box in the back, and the name tags as well, we recycle everything. Thank you very much and we hope to see you again on another occasion. Thank you.