

AFTERNOON SESSION

DR. MOCHIZUKI: If you can all take your seats and we'll get started. Secretary Perry's remarks you should turn to channel 10, and then the English channel is channel 2 in case we have some questions in Japanese.

It is a great honor to be able to introduce our keynote speaker, in fact, I'm very humbled by that. The Honorable William Perry is certainly one of the great statesmen of our time, he has served with distinction in many official posts, including, of course, the 19th Secretary of Defense, and during that tenure he was at the heart of some very important decisions that is the subject of our conference today. And, of course, we've already talked about the decision making regarding Okinawa, but in addition to that, he was in the situation room during the height of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. In addition to that, in 1996 he was instrumental in some key decisions regarding the Taiwan Missile Crisis.

So, he has had to make very tough decisions in order to preserve peace and security in the Asia Pacific. In addition to being a policymaker, I've always seen him as an intellectual titan. You know, as a student of international security affairs I've studied – read and studied most of his works and was quite influenced by some of the concepts that he developed, including the concept of cooperative security, the concept of preventive defense. And even after his retirement as Secretary of Defense he has been active in the policy world.

One of the things that I remember vividly is his role as head of a policy review on Korea, which later came to be known as the Perry Initiative. For me this was a model of trilateral consultations on a very important security issue between the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. And I often wonder if the Perry Initiative had, in fact, been fully implemented, we might not be in the position we are today regarding North Korea. So, it is with great honor that I introduce Dr. William Perry as our keynote speaker.

DR. PERRY: Thank you very much, Mike. It's a great honor to be here today, and I welcome the opportunity to talk at this distinguished gathering. My connection to Okinawa goes back indirectly 150 years when my ancestor, Commodore Perry visited the Ryukyu Islands several times. Directly it goes back 70 years when I first visited Okinawa. I suspect that my connection with Okinawa 70 years is longer than almost anybody's in this room. I was at the time a young engineer and I was sent to Okinawa to help in the rebuilding of the island after the incredible devastation inflicted by World War II. And the connection was very direct 20 years ago when I was the Secretary of Defense and was involved in creating an organization called SACO, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, which, among other things, proposed the Futenma replacement plan.

My interest then and my interest now from a national security point of view is preventing, or dealing, if necessary, with a military conflict with North Korea, in particular, preventing any military conflict with North Korea. The first crisis I had as Secretary of Defense in 1994 was North Korea and it was over North Korea's nuclear program. And in our intent to stop North Korea from getting a nuclear bomb, we

almost came to war. I don't know how many of you realize how close we were to a war with North Korea in 1994, but in my judgment, it was about a 50/50 shot, it was very close.

I was involved again in 1999 when President Clinton – now I was out of office back at Stanford, but the president asked me to come back in temporarily to work on putting together a plan which resolved the crisis with North Korea. And I put together a tripartite team of Americans, Japanese and South Koreans where we formulated a program to try to deal with the North Korean problem. And then I was then sent to Pyongyang and spent almost a week there negotiating with officials on a proposal, which we had a handshake agreement on at the time.

And getting back to Mike's earlier point, had that agreement actually been consummated, I think we'd be – it's hard to say where we'd be specifically today, but I think we'd be – undoubtedly be a lot better off than we are today in dealing with this crisis. When I was preparing my comments for this talk a week or so ago it was more focused directly on Okinawa. But then something happened in the news, which you're all familiar with, in which there was an agreement for a summit meeting to deal with the North Korean problem. And so, I shifted my talk, I thought I would talk instead about that summit meeting and its potential for success. Because if it were to be fully successful, if it were to remove the danger of a North Korean military incursion into South Korea, it would completely change the security aspect in the Asia-Pacific Region. And specifically removing that threat would remove entirely the rationale for U.S. military forces based in Japan, and specifically based in Futenma.

The Futenma base, more than anything else, is there to respond quickly to a North Korean incursion into South Korea. Why quickly? Quickly because, as I think you're all aware, the North Korean military forces are located within about 50 miles of Seoul, the metropolis of South Korea. And so, while we have always been confident that the U.S. – combined U.S. - South Korean force could defeat any North Korean military incursion, we also fear there would be very great damage done to the residents of Seoul before that happened. So, the whole purpose of the U.S. military planning relative to North Korea is to get reinforcements in very, very quickly to stop the North Korean forces from being able to enter Seoul. And I must say a very key component of that are the forces at Futenma.

The rapid reinforcement, both land and air forces, are a key part of that plan. Therefore, if we were to be able to solve the North Korean threat, the North Korean danger, that would go a long way towards removing the rationale for even having military forces in Okinawa, and could, I believe, in time lead to a situation where the forces in Okinawa could be removed altogether. Not just a matter of relocating them, but simply removing them from Okinawa. That's not going to happen, obviously, very soon, but it would be very important to know whether that is a serious prospect for the future. Whether that's a serious prospect depends, I think, very, very much on the summit meeting which is going to be coming up – advertised to be coming up in April.

I wanted to provide you historically that in 1994 President Carter went to Pyongyang to negotiate the denuclearization of North Korea – to negotiate the denuclearization of North Korea.⁶ In 1999, five years later, I went to Pyongyang. Why? To negotiate the denuclearization of North Korea. And now it seems possible that President Trump will meet with Kim Jong-un to negotiate the denuclearization of North Korea. The same goal in 1994, 1999 and now today. So, this raises a very obvious question in my mind, are there any lessons that this administration can learn from both the successes and the failures of those two previous attempts in 1994 and 1999? I'm going to address those points.

I believe the first lesson and the most fundamental lesson were that North Korea at a very high cost, both a political and financial high cost, has pursued for decades a nuclear program. Why? Why have they pursued it? They have pursued it to ensure the survival of their regime. The survival of their regime. That was quite obvious to me in the week that I spent in Pyongyang. It became clear that North Korea believed that the United States not only had the intent but had the capability to overthrow the North Korean regime, and that the only way they could prevent that from happening was to deter the United States from carrying out that plan with nuclear capability. They understood that their military forces could not stand up to the combined might of South Korea and American military forces, and, therefore, they saw that nuclear forces were the only way out. Now, spending less than a week in a country you cannot learn everything about the regime, but that lesson – that lesson was absolutely clear to me and to my entire team.

The second lesson we learned was that North Korean leaders were not and are not crazy. They are despotic, they're ruthless, they're cruel to their own people, but they are not crazy. They have a rationale for their actions, namely, to stay in power. And they followed that rationale with consistency, and I must say with shrewdness. To make my point about how successful they've been in that, I will note every other Stalinist regime in the world has disappeared in the last few decades. North Korea is the last one standing. From their point of view, they're doing something right.

The third lesson we learned, that the regime is not driven by ideology. Basically, they've decided they cannot afford an ideology that did not support their overarching goal of regime survival. As a result, they were quite flexible in the means they used to achieve that goal. A corollary of that is they're not bound by any ethical or moral standards. To them, anything goes if it satisfies that basic goal. To agree with North Korea is not really binding on them if they see some advantage in breaking that agreement, particularly if they could do so clandestinely. And their history of evading agreements in the last few decades bears that out.

And the final and fourth lesson, and it's a very important one, is they rather value economic incentives, which we were offering to them at various times in our negotiations, and they would bargain for those, but they would never, never trade regime survival for economic incentives. And conversely, economic disincentives; namely, sanctions, will never force them to give up their nuclear program. We and four

⁶ He says this twice for emphasis.

other countries have negotiated with them for a decade trying to use economic incentives to cause them to give up their nuclear regime, and those negotiations have been unsuccessful.

When I had my meeting with them and I wrote my final report, which reiterated these lessons I've given you today, I ended it by saying something very important, then and now as well. I said we must deal with North Korea as it is and not as we would wish it to be. A corollary of that is when we're dealing with them as it is, we have to understand where they are and where they're coming from, and that's the importance of these four lessons I've given to you today. I've given some cautionary lessons, but these lessons do not lead to the conclusion that we should not negotiate with North Korea. Quite the contrary, we should negotiate with them, but we should negotiate with them with a full understanding of who we're dealing with and what is driving them.

In particular, any agreement that's made with them must be subject to a rigorous verification process that is included in the agreement. And that verification process can be very difficult when the country that is rightly called the Hermit Kingdom. These lessons do call into question whether the United States can ever achieve its stated goal of denuclearization. The stated goal when President Carter went there in '94; when I went there in '99, and now the stated goal if we have a summit meeting this year. Can we ever really negotiate our⁷ arsenal away? The North Koreans believe, as I said, that that arsenal is crucial to preventing any military attack on their country, and they believe that attack would be successful, it would cause an overthrow of their regime.

So, the question we have to ask ourselves, why would they give up their nuclear arsenal if that's what it's for? Or put another way, what could we offer them that would persuade them that their security can be achieved without a nuclear arsenal? That's a very difficult task, and as we approach this summit meeting, I'm very hopeful that our leaders will understand that that's the issue they're going to be facing when they come up to discussions with North Korea. When we negotiated with them in '99, besides the incentives we were offering them, we were offering them security assurances, assurances that we would not take military action to overthrow their regime. I understood then that they needed that assurance, or they would not give up their nuclear weapons, and that is still true today. We were able to get that agreement in 1999, but in '99 while we were negotiating with an agreement not to pursue a nuclear program.⁸ Today it's an agreement to give up a nuclear arsenal that they already have, and that's a much steeper mountain to climb, it's a much harder goal to negotiate.

And so, my first advice to the administration as they proceed forward to this summit meeting is I have to admit to a high degree of skepticism that North Korea really will negotiate away their nuclear arsenal, even though they have stated they would do so. Words are important. What do they mean by negotiate away and how long might that take and under what conditions and under what verification processes? Suppose my skepticism is misplaced and they do negotiate away their nuclear weapons, then we are faced with a second question, how do we verify - how do we verify that agreement? Verification is critical in any arms control agreement, but particularly so with North Korea given its history of breaking agreements.

⁷ He probably means "their" but said "our"

⁸ He probably means "in '99 we were negotiating an agreement not to pursue a nuclear program"

And here I must say I run into a very fundamental stumbling block. I do not know of, nor can I conceive of, any way of confidently verifying an agreement whereby North Korea states they will give up their nuclear arsenal, they will dismantle all of their nuclear arsenal and facilities for making more. Why is that so difficult? Well, first of all, we don't know how many nuclear weapons North Korea has. There are estimates, some estimate 20, some say 25. Suppose they come in and say they have 15 and they'll give up 15 and they'll demonstrate they're giving up 15. What if they have 25 or 30? There are still then a number left. Same comments about the facilities.

But the most fundamentally difficult problem is verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads. And I want to give you one historical reference to this, we've had many nuclear agreements with first the Soviet Union and later with Russia. None of those agreements ever called for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads, none of them. Even to mention nuclear warheads, they even mentioned the number of nuclear warheads, but they really involved dismantlement of the carriers, the missiles that carried them. And our way of verifying was to verify that the missiles were destroyed, the silos were destroyed, say, and we inferred from that how many warheads were destroyed. We never had a way of counting Russian or Soviet nuclear warheads. Even today if you would ask me how many nuclear warheads Russia has, and we have an arms control agreement with them called New Start, we can verify the number of operational systems they have deployed, but we have no idea how many nuclear warheads they might have in storage and reserve. And our estimates of that could be off not by 10 or 100, it could be off by thousands.

So, it would be a fundamental error to believe that we could verify reliably a treaty by which North Korea agreed to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons and to not build more. But because we can't verify that kind of an agreement does not mean we shouldn't negotiate a disarmament agreement with North Korea, in contrary, we should move forward and try to negotiate an agreement. We know that North Korea has a nuclear arsenal and we must do all we can to contain and deter that arsenal. And we can strengthen our containment by reaching an agreement with North Korea on various things that would lower the danger. We could get, for example, a testing ban on nuclear weapons, we might be able to get a testing ban on the testing of long-range missiles, both of which we could verify with a high degree of reliability.

We should definitely want some sort of an agreement that stops the transfer of any nuclear weapons or components or technology. That would be more difficult to verify, but also something that's worth trying to do. This we could do in the short term. In the long term we might move forward to a denuclearization agreement, but I would point out to you that's not going to happen very soon in any way that we can reliably verify. So, the first step, I think, is to get various agreements that lower the danger, and then work over the longer term to remove it altogether. The goal should be denuclearization, but understanding it's going to take a long time to achieve that.

So, let me sum up my comment about the summit meeting. I believe useful – very useful results can be attained from negotiations, some of them directly and immediately. Others then can be setting up a

process which over the long period of time can end the denuclearization.⁹ My concern is that negotiations may turn out to fail because we are entering them with unrealistic expectations because we expect immediate results, short term, that are just simply not reasonable to achieve. But I do believe that a deal can be had to significantly improve our security and the security of our allies.

And I want to end my comments by saying that deal is there and available, I think. The other unrealistic goal, an immediate denuclearization is, I think, not there. And so, we should pursue the deal that is there, that is we should not let the best be the enemy of the good. If there's something good we can do and we are to achieve it, we should not let ourselves be dissuaded from pursuing that because we cannot achieve everything we want right away. Thank you very much.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much, Secretary Perry for that very wise advice. Before I open it up to the floor, may I link what you said back to the Okinawa issue? And, you know, I think everyone here in the room would agree that if the North Korean nuclear issue were to be solved completely, then there would be immense opportunities to reduce the U.S. military presence on Okinawa, and the Futenma issue would probably go away. But given what you've said, that it's unlikely that we will achieve the ultimate objective, but we may need to settle for something that's better than what we have today, and also avoid a war.

So given that you talked about the importance of containment and deterrence as well, I guess, well, you know, one issue is, you know, of course Futenma is critical to any kind of contingency plan in regarding a North Korean military confrontation, but do you think it might be also wise to consider other contingency options? For example, given that if there is a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the Marine contingent on Okinawa may not be sufficient to deal with such a contingency and you would probably need to bring Marine combat forces from other places and perhaps the continent of the United States.

So do you think it might make sense for the Japanese government to work with the U.S. government to think of other ways of facilitating the rapid deployment of U.S. Forces for a Korean contingency? Possibly the use of military defense facilities on the main islands of Japan and not on Okinawa, like on Kyushu, which is closer to Korea, and also closer to the amphibious ships which are home ported in Sasebo?

DR. PERRY: First of all, Mike, let me just say that you drew the correct conclusions about the connection between the summit meeting negotiations and the possible issues in Okinawa. My conclusion is that the summit meeting, if successful, which I hope it will be, will take a long time in implementation of a denuclearization and, therefore, this issue is not going to go away very soon. And, therefore, I don't see a quick resolution to the Okinawa problem from any agreements we make at the summit meeting.

⁹ He probably means "end with denuclearization"

On your second question, the forces at Futenma are only a small part of the response we would have to make to a North Korean military incursion into South Korea. They are the part – they are the tip of the spear, as we call it. They're the first forces over there, the forces that are there specifically to stop the North Koreans before they get deeply into Seoul. That's why they are there and that's what their purpose would be. But the bulk of the defense is going to fall on the South Korean military forces and the big role of the United States military forces in this is to provide air support for them. And those reinforcements – while some of it comes from Okinawa, the large bulk of it comes from other locations. They come from Japan, they come from Alaska, they come from the state of Washington, from the McChord Air Base there.

So, the main military strength to the allied forces in fighting back a North Korean incursion are going to come from mainland Japan, from Alaska and from the mainland United States that would far overwhelm the already small contribution from Futenma. Futenma's role is specifically focused on the immediate stopping of the North Korean Forces before they get into Seoul. They are not in itself sufficient to defeat the North Korean forces.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much. So, the floor is now open for questions. If you can raise –

DR. PERRY: Excuse me, Mike, I'll just say one other thing. When we had – when I was Secretary of Defense, when we had a crisis pending in 1994, which as I told you, I thought had possibly a 50/50 change of ending up in warfare, I was busy sending reinforcements to South Korea at the time. But I also met with the prime minister of Japan and told him that if this broke out, we were doing everything we can to prevent it from becoming military, but if it went into military, we would require large numbers of U.S. aircraft being staged through Japanese bases, air bases, to go into South Korea. The bulk of the defense would actually go through the mainland of Japan, not through Okinawa.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you. Any questions? Don't be shy. I mean, I've got plenty of questions, but - please state your name and affiliation before asking your question.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. A reporter from Voice of America. This morning President Trump replaced Secretary of State Tillerson with CIA Director Pompeo, so my question is whether Mr. Pompeo is a bad choice for the negotiation between U.S. and North Korea. Thank you.

DR. PERRY: What was the question?

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Today President Trump replaced Secretary of State Tillerson with Mike Pompeo, and whether the new Secretary of State would be a bad or a good choice for the negotiations.

DR. PERRY: I don't know. I like to speak authoritatively on issues where I have expert knowledge. I don't like to pontificate on issues where I do not have expert knowledge. And in this case, the honest answer to your question is I don't know.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Well, there is an issue where you also played a key role, which is the issue of cross-strait relations during the Taiwan Missile Crisis in 1996. Anyone that looks at the map would see the Okinawa Prefecture as being right at the center of a possible contingency over Taiwan. What's your analysis of the possibility of a Taiwan contingency and what can the United States and Japan do and what should they do to deter such a conflict?

DR. PERRY: In 1996 when that cross-strait incident occurred, we considered the possibility of some kind of a military conflict between China and Taiwan, while it was not high, it also was not low either, we were concerned about it. I mean, the Chinese conducted missile firings, some of which impacted just 10, 20 miles from Taiwan, we thought that was a very dangerous provocation which might escalate.

And so, I requested permission from President Clinton and got permission from him to send two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait area as a signal of resolve to China that we were committed to the defense of Taiwan and they should not get involved in military conflict there. It was meant to deter a military action, not to stimulate a military action. That action was successful, the crisis was resolved, went away, and for many, many years now we do not see Taiwan as a potential problem.

But our main action in the last few decades has not been military, it's been working with Taiwan and with China to try to lower the possibility of a conflict there. One of the main features we were promoting was increased commerce, increased trade, increased traffic between Taiwan and the mainland so that the impetus for some kind of a conflict would be greatly reduced. One specific incident, which is very, very important, was the starting of commercial air traffic between Taiwan and the mainland. In 1996 when that incident occurred there was no such commercial air traffic. That now is a robust ticket today, and I think today both Taiwan and China understand to¹⁰ be very, very great damage to each other commercially if there were any kind of a military conflict. So that problem had been greatly reduced, I think.

We do not see Taiwan today as a major potential for conflict, and that's the good news. The military action we took in '96 was a stopgap measure, it was intended to deal with that specific problem, it was never intended to be a long-term solution. As a matter of fact, our military deployment of two carrier battle groups over the long term had a negative impact, a negative impact because – I'm a chess player, and those of you who are a chess player know something called the fallacy of the last move. So, we made this move of sending two carrier battle groups to Taiwan, it solved that immediate problem, but it led to other problems. It led to China making a second move and third move and so on. It led to China building up a very enhanced military capability for attacking carrier battle groups in the Taiwan Strait. So, every action has a reaction and a counter action.

¹⁰ He probably means "there would be"

The most fundamentally important thing we've done in the Taiwan Strait is to work for a diplomatic solution to that problem so that the danger of a military conflict is greatly reduced, and that is why it's important. So today I think the bad news is that it would be much more difficult to enforce a military solution through our carrier battle groups because of the buildup of the Chinese forces. We can still resist that because we have a – they made their move, and then we made our move, too, which is how you resist those new defenses they're building. But the main lesson is that the solution to the Taiwan Strait problem is not a military solution, it's a diplomatic solution, and in that area, there's been very substantial progress made, I'm happy to report.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you. So, Professor Nozoe and Professor Rabson.

MR. KIKUCHI: My name is Kunio Kikuchi and I am former World Bank staff and consultant now. You repeated a number of times that the Air Force interventions should there be an event with North Korea invading the south will come from the mainland of Japan and not from Okinawa. And I'm a little puzzled at that because, as you know, Okinawa has a lot of typhoons going there. And each time a typhoon comes close I look at the Kadena Air Force Base preparation and they are very proud that they are the largest overseas Air Force of the United States – overseas base, and during Vietnam War of course Kadena was very busy. Why is it that you think Kadena would be secondary to any Air Force base such as Misawa in the mainland? That's one question.

The other thing is the point of spear. In the last 20 years a lot has changed in military technology, especially on drones and such, and missiles, and do you really – does the Marines realistically think that they could send Marines packaged into Ospreys to the front line, which would be like sending sort of targets into North Korean missiles? Those two questions. Thank you.

DR. PERRY: Actually, a very complicated question. I don't know which elements of it to address. First of all, the forces we now have based in South Korea and Japan are only a fraction of the forces we would have to bring to bear if we got involved in a military conflict. The rest of the forces have to be brought in from Alaska and from military bases in the state of Washington, from, you know, the mainland United States. Those forces are far superior for a larger – any force we already have based in the area. Most of those forces would be staged – would be sent to South Korea but they would be staged through air bases in the mainland Japan, not in Okinawa. Okinawa is – the base there which sends the resident forces to North Korea but would not be a significant staging base as the main air base in Japan would be.

We have large numbers of naval forces and air forces which would have to be moved to the area, and they would be staged through the other islands in Japan, not through Okinawa. And I guess the bottom line is that the military forces which are based in Okinawa are only a fraction of what would be needed to deal with a conventional warfare in – conventional war with North Korea.

DR. NOZOE: Hi, my name is Fumiaki Nozoe, Okinawa International University. I watched the NHK TV program last year where you appeared. In this program you testified that the about the Futenma Air Base - you thought that as an alternative of the relocation facility outside of Okinawa, but you said that Japanese government was against that plan. So, the relocation plan was replaced on Okinawa, so I understand that.

So, my question is why did you seek another plan outside of Okinawa? And the second question is why do you think the Japanese government was against the plan outside of Okinawa?

DR. PERRY: Could you repeat the question, please? For the whole audience.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Yes, the question is, as I understand it, Professor Nozoe's question is that when Secretary Perry visited Okinawa last year he gave an interview that was reported on NHK, and in considering the various options for Futenma, that there may be other alternatives outside of Okinawa, but the reason why that was not considered is because the Japanese government opposed that. Is that the question? And so, the question is why do you think the Japanese government opposed an alternative outside of Okinawa for the Futenma replacement facility?

DR. PERRY: I don't know. I know they did. I can speculate. Certainly, one of them is the substantial amount of time and the substantial amount of money it would take for major relocation of the base. Another speculation is the – while you solve the encroachment problems in Okinawa, you create encroachment problems wherever they are moved to. The issue of air bases encroaching on civilian population is worldwide, it's not limited to Okinawa. And it's not just military bases, its civilian air bases as well. So anywhere you move an air base, you're going to have some encroachment issues. All of those factors, I'm sure, were in the mind of the Japanese government when they took that position, but I cannot speak authoritatively on what their view was.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Secretary Perry has another meeting that he goes to, so Professor Rabson's question is the last one. If you could state it as briefly as you can.

DR. RABSON: Yes, I will. I'm Steve Rabson, and I was stationed at Okinawa in the Army in 1967, '68 at that very base in Henoko, which at that time was a nuclear weapons storage facility that is so much controversy now. But getting beyond that, I think there are an estimated 18,000 Marines in Okinawa today, and a number of experts on East Asian security have maintained that they don't need to be there, that the – that, as you mentioned, the most important force is at Futenma, there are 2,000 Marines in the Marine Expeditionary Unit that would be deployed in the case of an invasion of Korea from the north.

So why don't these other Marines, these other 16,000 Marines, why can't they train somewhere else? Why do they have to be in Okinawa? Why can't they train at Camp Pendleton or Camp Lejeune or somewhere else? Why don't we get them out and there will be less chance of murderers and rapists and

accidents with helicopters and other aircraft? So, I ask you, why do all those Marines need to be there? Why can't they move out to somewhere else?

DR. PERRY: Well, they could. They could. There's going to be substantial expense involved doing it, and you speak about, for example, doing it at Camp Pendleton, there are people that live around Camp Pendleton, too, you know, they might have ideas and issues about this. Encroachment on civilian population is not unique to Futenma, it's not unique to Okinawa. It's anywhere you establish an air base, in particular anywhere you establish a military air base.

So, yes, they could be moved. Aside from the time involved and aside from the cost involved, they're moved into somebody else's backyard. And the cliché in the United States is not in my backyard. Do it in somebody else's backyard, not in my backyard. It needs done, but I don't want it done in my backyard, I want it done in somebody else's. And that's really the fundamental issue with this, it's – about the point that you're addressing. Sure, it can be done somewhere else. Cost to do it, time to do it and the creating of encroachment problems for wherever you move them to. Thank you.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much, Secretary Perry, for your always wise counsel. And I hope the current government takes your advice about how to approach the North Korea Issue. Thank you very much.

DR. PERRY: Thank you.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Okay. We're going to break for just about five minutes for you to stand up and stretch, and then we'll immediately move to our afternoon panel discussion. So, if the panelists in the afternoon could come up to the table that would be terrific. Thank you very much.