Transcript for CHANGING EAST ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND OKINAWA: Re-examining the U.S. Force Posture in Japan

FIRST SESSION

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Good morning everyone, my name is Mike Mochizuki, I’m with the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. And I would like to welcome all of you to this conference on changing East Asian security dynamics in Okinawa, reexamining the U.S. force posture in Japan. I think it’s undeniable that over the last 20 years there’s been a dramatic change in the regional security environment, North Korea has been developing its missile and nuclear capabilities. In addition to that, China’s power capabilities have grown enormously, and its military activities have increased near Japan, and this is leading to a change in security perceptions in the region.

In addition to that, there’s been over the last 20 years significant progress in defense cooperation between the United States and Japan, and certainly there have been major advances in military technologies, including the precision as well as the legality of military weapons systems. And that definitely has an impact on the security development. Also, over the last 20 years there’s been a number of efforts to reduce the U.S. military footprint and personnel in Okinawa. In spring 1996 after the Special Action Committee on Okinawa issued a report, the United States promised to return Futenma Marine Corps Air Station back to Japan.

And then in 2002 the United States and Japan launched the Defense Policy Review Initiative, which culminated in a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan to implement a major realignment of U.S. bases in Japan, including the redeployment of Marine personnel from Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii. Now, although the SACO Report – according to the SACO Report in 1996, the United States promised to return Futenma within seven years, and that would have been, I guess, around 2004. This has yet to happen, in large part because of the delay in the construction of the so-called Futenma replacement facility in Henoko.

Still the majority of Okinawans remain opposed to the Futenma replacement facility and Henoko, and many Okinawans continue to believe that they shoulder an unfair burden for maintaining security from which all of Japan benefits. So, with the changing regional security environment, the Okinawan Islands continues to be strategically important for both U.S. and Japanese security interests, and it’s likely that the strategic significance of Okinawa will continue to increase. But at the same time, the military assets in Okinawa have become increasingly vulnerable, raising questions whether it makes sense to have so much of the U.S. military assets concentrated in Okinawa.

So, at this conference today what we will do is examine the implications of the changing security landscape in the region and the evolution of Okinawan politics, and especially public opinion regarding the U.S. force posture in Japan and in the rest of the Asia-Pacific Region. And this conference will have three segments, the first segment this morning we will hear from Governor Onaga for a perspective from
Okinawa, as well as two distinguished commentators. Then we’ll break for lunch, and then Secretary William Perry will give a keynote speech, and then in the afternoon we will have a panel discussion with three experts regarding the subject of this conference.

So, I’d like to begin with the first segment, and it is indeed an honor and a great pleasure to welcome back to Washington, D.C. Governor Takeshi Onaga of Okinawa. Governor Onaga, as you know, has had a distinguished political career in Okinawa. He first was elected to the Naha City Assembly in 1985 and served there for many years, and then served in the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly. I first met him when he was mayor of Naha, and he served four terms as mayor of Naha City, and then he was elected as Governor of Okinawa in 2014. So welcome again to Washington, D.C., and we look forward to hearing your remarks. And then afterwards I will introduce our two commentators. Governor Onaga.

GOVERNOR ONAGA [JAPANESE]

(Introduction)

Thank you all very much for participating in this symposium today. My name is Takeshi Onaga, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.

It is a great honor and privilege that we have the former Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry here to give the keynote speech. Also, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Professor Mike Mochizuki of George Washington University for making this symposium possible. I am also grateful to the experts who are participating in the panel discussion.

Today, I would like to take 30 minutes to discuss various topics, and we’ve prepared some English documents related to the U.S. military issues in Okinawa. I will be referring to the information contained within, so please also use it as a reference.

(U.S. base issue in Okinawa)

As Professor Mochizuki just mentioned earlier, I was elected as the Governor of Okinawa and this is my fourth time to visit Washington D.C. On each visit, I’ve had opportunities to exchange opinions with U.S. stakeholders in various ways, including at symposiums like this.

Okinawa Prefecture is in a position to understand the needs of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

When I discuss the relocation of Futenma Air Station out of Okinawa and out of Japan, some people think that Okinawa is against all U.S. military bases on the island. However, if the Futenma Air Base is returned to Okinawa, we will only gain 0.7% of the total land that is occupied by the U.S. military on the island.
Therefore, what I’m against is the mere 0.7% of the total base area. I’ve been trying to raise the issue that the burden of the U.S military bases on Okinawa should be reduced as much as possible, based on the understanding of the Japan-U.S Security Arrangements.

Despite the opposition of the Okinawan people against base relocation within Okinawa, both the U.S. and Japanese governments are pushing forward with construction without reconsidering their claim that Henoko is the only solution for the Futenma relocation.

What is more, Prime Minister Abe stated in the National Diet that the reason for the stagnant progress towards reducing the military base burden on Okinawa is because relocating those bases to the Japanese mainland would not be accepted by the people there.

As for the Okinawan side – and this is about 5 years ago – all of the mayors of the 41 municipalities in Okinawa, the Chair of the Prefectural Assembly, the Chair of the Naha City Assembly, as well as myself, went to Tokyo to express our opposition. However, that was completely ignored, and the government insists that Henoko is the only solution.

If a governor or mayor in mainland Japan refused to accept U.S. military bases on their land, it would not be possible to relocate them there. However, even if all of the Okinawan people raise their voices in protest, those voices are not heard. I would like you to understand that this is a real situation that a local government is actually facing in Japan.

Regarding the reason for having a U.S. Marine Corps base in Okinawa, members of Diet and experts have said that the Marine Corps base does not have to be in Okinawa from a military perspective. However, from a political perspective, it does have to be in Okinawa. What that means is that since the mainland will not accept it, Futenma Air Station therefore exists in Okinawa.

Under such circumstances, we sincerely hope that the U.S. and Japanese governments will propose a realistic solution to reduce the burden of military bases in Okinawa, and that the solution will be implemented.

If things move forward based on the idea that “Henoko is the only solution,” it will be difficult to sustain stable Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. We would like both the U.S. side and all Japanese people to fully understand this issue.

(About Okinawa)
Though some of you may already know a lot about Okinawa, I would like to talk about it for those who do not know much about Okinawa. A map of Okinawa is in the document I mentioned earlier, so please refer to it as I speak.

Okinawa is composed of 160 islands located in the southernmost and westernmost part of Japan, stretching 1,000 km east to west, and 400 km north to south. The entire population is 1.44 million. Many of you might think that Okinawa has a small population because of the vast military bases, but even the mainland of Okinawa, which holds the U.S. bases, has 1.2 million residents. In this small area, 15% of the mainland of Okinawa is covered by U.S. military bases, so establishing a road network has been difficult, and ambulances have to drive around the military bases. This is the extremely challenging reality that Okinawa faces.

Okinawa Prefecture represents only 0.6% of the entire country, but 70.4% of the facilities exclusively used by U.S. military forces in Japan are located in Okinawa. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements have been sustained as a result of Okinawa’s great sacrifice.

(History of Okinawa)

Historically speaking, Okinawa Prefecture used to be an independent kingdom. However, with the abolition of the feudal domains and the establishment of prefectures in 1879, Okinawa became a Japanese prefecture.

Regarding the era when Okinawa became a part of Japan, later today we will have the honor of listening to the former Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry, whose great-uncle five generations ago was the very Commodore Perry who came to Uraga. Actually, Commodore Perry visited the Ryukyu Kingdom five times and stayed for 85 days before heading to Uraga. The first place he visited in Japan is known as Uraga; that’s correct. However, he also visited Okinawa five times, staying for 85 days. This is the Treaty of Amity between the Ryukyu Kingdom and the United States, which contains Commodore Perry’s signature. You may not be able to see it in the back, but that is what is written in kanji characters and in English. Back in those days, Ryukyu also had a treaty with Holland. This is the historical background to the relationship between Okinawa and the United States.

It has been 61 years since Okinawa became a part of Japan in 1879. Okinawa was the last battlefield at the end of World War II. Out of about 400,000 Okinawans, more than 100,000 died in the battle—leaving only 2 - 300,000 Okinawans on the island—as well as about 10,000 U.S. soldiers and about 100,000 Japanese soldiers. It was a devastating battle.

(Formation of U.S. military bases)

Eventually, Japan lost the war. When U.S. forces arrived in Okinawa, many Okinawan people were sent to the refugee and could not return to their hometowns. While more than 200,000 people spent time in the
camps, the U.S. forces leveled farms, rice fields, and residential areas in order to construct Futenma Airfield, Kadena Air Base, and other facilities.

The U.S. military was also in mainland Japan, but the bases on the mainland had originally been built by the Japanese armed forces. They just repurposed those bases for use by the U.S. military.

As for Okinawa Prefecture, the U.S. forces created new military bases out of nothing—in areas with no prior military bases. In this way, 15% of the land in the southern and central parts of Okinawa were occupied by U.S. military facilities. That has not really changed even now, 70 years on.

I was originally a member of the Liberal Democratic Party, so I fully understand the importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In order to maintain security and peace in the Asia region, including in East Asia and the Far East, I think having a functioning Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement is in fact a good thing. However, the fact that more than 70% of U.S. military bases are placed on a land area representing only 0.6% of the nation’s total, in addition to what Okinawa has already undergone, shows that the mainland Japan does not sufficiently value Okinawans’ concerns.

(Regarding Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements)

As the Governor of Okinawa, it is my duty to protect the life and prosperity of Okinawan people, and my number one concern is to safeguard these, even with respect to security arrangements. Crimes continue to occur, such as the rape of an elementary school girl by U.S. soldiers in 1995 and the rape and murder of a 20-year-old woman by a U.S. military contractor in 2016. I believe that without solving these problems, the true meaning of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements cannot be fulfilled.

The reason for having the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements is to protect freedom, equality, democracy, and human rights in Asia and the world. That is why we have been following it in this liberal democracy. However, 70% of U.S. military bases in Japan have been concentrated on Okinawa, which is just 0.6% of the total land area of Japan, and this situation has not changed for 70 years. That is something that we cannot accept, even though we understand the importance of the Arrangements.

In addition, if this new Henoko military base is built, it will be used for 100 or 200 years. Even if all the land currently used by Futenma Air Station were returned to Okinawa after the aircraft stationed there moved to the new Henoko military base, and if the bases south from Kadena moved to the northern area of Okinawa, the total land to be returned would be only 0.7% of all military base on the island. That represents a mere 0.7% decrease from the total 70%.

When the U.S. forces first occupied Okinawa and constructed military bases, they forcefully took over the land with guns and bulldozers, flattening the housing areas in order to build a new base, Futenma Air
When the Okinawan people went back there after the war, there was a big base there, and they could not even enter their own hometowns. There used to be a town office, schools, and a post office, catering to 14,000 residents, but those people could not go home. That is why they ended up living around Futenma Air Station.

Callous people may say, “The people who live around the bases know and accept the risk because they get economic benefits,” and such sentiments deeply sadden those people who live around Futenma and other bases.

Those people wanted to go back to their homes, but they could not. They stayed around the bases because their family graves were there. Therefore, insensitive comments suggesting that U.S. military bases brought fortune to the areas deeply hurt Okinawans’ feelings.

In a situation like this, where the truth about Okinawa has not been correctly understood outside of the prefecture, the Prime Minister explained in the National Diet that the bases are kept in Okinawa because other places in mainland Japan will not give the approval to relocate the bases there. The explanation was deeply disappointing for us.

Regarding the Okinawan economy and how it has changed over time, of course, right after the war 50% of Okinawa Prefecture’s GDP was generated from the bases on the island.

Traditionally, farming was the core of the economy, but the farms were all bombed in the war. Further, there were no other jobs available, because Okinawa’s factories had also been destroyed, and related industries such as distribution businesses had suffered from catastrophic damages. Ironically, the only jobs available were in constructing the new U.S. military bases. Okinawan people spent the postwar period building roads and buildings for the bases. Back then, 50% of the GDP of Okinawa was related to U.S. military bases; to earn a living, there was no choice but to work for the U.S. bases. That’s just how it was.

Twenty-seven years after the war, Okinawa was returned to Japanese sovereignty, and the Okinawan people became citizens of Japan. The economic activity in Okinawa from base-related revenue was 15% in that period. It had gone down from 50% to 15%. It has now been decades since the reversion, and the economic contribution from the U.S. military bases to the Okinawan economy has only been about 5% since about 20 years ago.
Today, the GDP of Okinawa Prefecture has increased to 36.5 billion dollar\(^1\), showing great developments in tourism, information technology, and logistics. This is thanks to Okinawa’s efforts to be independent from the economic influence of the U.S. military bases. We have instead taken advantage of the dynamism of Asia by playing a role as a bridge between Japan and the rest of Asia. Now, as we are reaching the 70\(^{th}\) year of those efforts, Okinawa’s economy has made great strides forward.

I’ve been saying this for about five years now, but when I talk about these issues, people ask me if I’m against the U.S. forces. This is an exaggeration and that is not at all what I’m saying. The idea that Okinawa’s economic prosperity is thanks to the U.S. military bases was only true in the past. Back then, we had no way of producing anything because the war had destroyed everything, so there was no choice but to depend on the bases.

For the last 30-40 years, we have made—of course with support from the Japanese government—great economic progress. Within that context, I am saying that Okinawa’s economic dependence on the U.S. military has decreased over time.

(Land usage of returned U.S. military bases)

The ratio of U.S. base-related revenue has decreased from 50% to 5% and this is also written in the document I mentioned earlier. For instance, 215 hectares of U.S. residential land in Naha City—where military personnel used to live—were returned 30 years ago. When I was the Mayor of Naha, a brand new town was created on that land from which we had been receiving 47 million dollar from the U.S. Forces for the lease of the 165 hectares of land.

Back then, some landowners were worried that if their land were returned, they would not have any way of making a living. However, we started developing these 215 hectares of land 17 years ago and the development finally finished five years ago. Here is the economic difference: instead of 47 million dollar of income, we now get 540 million dollar. That is more than ten times what we used to make.

As for employment, jobs such as mowing the grass and repairing military housing were offered to about 170 people in the 215 hectares of land. The land was then returned, and there are currently 17,000 people working in the Shintoshin area. That is 100 times more jobs created than when it was a military base.

Tax revenue has grown 30-fold; it used to be 5.4 million dollar, whereas it is now 179 million dollar. The 5.4 million dollar tax revenue was from 47 million dollar’s worth of land property. Now that a big city has been created, it produces 179 million dollar in tax revenue.

\(^1\) All figures in Japanese Yen in this translation are converted into U.S Dollar. (The applied exchange rate: 1 USD = 111 JPY (The Foreign Exchange Rates of Bank of Japan, as of March 2018)).
Thus, the notion that the military bases contributed to Okinawa’s economic growth was true in the past, but now, in a sense they actually hinder the growth.

I do understand the importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as I used to be the Chair of the Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa. We’ve been following the treaty arrangements. The treaty is certainly important, but in terms of Okinawa’s economic growth we are confronted with conflicting circumstances.

(About Oura Bay in Henoko, the relocation site for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma)

When Futenma Air Station is returned, I’d like the entire nation of Japan to reconsider its deterrent capabilities and geographic circumstances. During the Korean War, bases in Kitakyushu were originally used to respond to North Korea and China. When the war was over, anti-U.S. base protests arose all across the mainland Japan. As a result, Marine bases were relocated from Yamanashi and Gifu prefectures as well as the Kyushu region to Okinawa, because Okinawa was under the occupation of the U.S. forces for 27 years after the war. That is why we have 70% of the U.S. military bases in Japan.

Therefore, the fact is that the mainland Japan is opposed to hosting the U.S military bases. However, when the Okinawan people raise their voices in a similar way, some people complain that Okinawa is in contact with China. However, in the 1950s the mainlanders rejected hosting the U.S. forces and that is why the U.S. forces came to Okinawa. That is a historical fact. Futenma Air Station is to be relocated to a new military base to be built in the Henoko area where the beautiful ocean contains coral reefs and attracts dugongs. They will reclaim an area of 165 hectares to build a new military base.

When I share this with people from different prefectures, I find that it’s hard for them to empathize. Therefore, every time I have a chance to talk to them, I ask, “Would you reclaim Akita’s beautiful Lake Towada for national security?”, “Would you reclaim Miyagi’s famous Matsushima Bay for national security?”, or “Would you reclaim Lake Biwa in Shiga for national security?” When I ask those questions, I think that people might then understand how awful it would be to reclaim the beautiful natural surroundings to build military bases.

Oura Bay, which is to be reclaimed, contains 262 kinds of endangered species; this is the most in Japan, even including Natural World Heritage sites, despite the area not yet having been designated as a World Heritage site. On top of the 262 endangered species, 5,800 kinds of creatures live in the Bay, including dugongs, red sea turtles, green sea turtles, and forests of coral reefs. They are planning to fill all this in, which will require two million ten-ton dump trucks’ worth of reclaimed land. Two million trucks!

That is how much ocean is being filled to build a new base, so I hope you understand the sadness of the Okinawan people.
(Successive U.S. military aircraft accidents)

On top of the difficulties with economic growth, there have been about 30 accidents involving U.S. military aircraft, especially helicopters, just in this past year, including forced landings, emergency landings, forced landings that led to fires, and crashes.

Maybe you’ve heard about this, but two or three months ago, on the grounds of Futenma Daini Elementary School, an aircraft window frame weighing 8 kg fell in the middle of an area where school children were playing. This happened last December.

Before that, part of an aircraft fell on the roof of a nursery school. Many incidents like that have happened, and we are astonished when we think about just how many incidents there have been. Before resolving one problem, another one takes place. We submit an official complaint about each incident, but it comes to the point where we wonder “what about the past 20 incidents?”

While we manage such duties, in between our regular local government work, I also travel to Tokyo about once a week—almost always to visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense—in order to discuss U.S. military-related issues.

As a governor or (in the case of other Okinawan local politicians) as a leader of a municipality, we have responsibilities for various issues including the social welfare of children and the elderly but most of our time is taken up by dealing with the base issues. If something were to change by raising our voice, that would be great, but nothing changes. Nothing has changed for such a long time. That is why I’ve come to Washington, D.C., visiting the U.S. Congress and talking to all of you, hoping that we can gain more understanding.

(Attitude of the Japanese Government and the situation in Okinawa)

Having strong ties between Japan and the U.S. regarding security arrangements is a good thing; however, what I see from having dealt with about 30 accidents last year is that nobody in the Japanese government, including Japan-U.S SOFA\(^2\) the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee which is in charge of managing the Japan-U.S. SOFA, has a way to overcome the problems.

That is to say, when the Japanese government negotiates with the U.S. government—even if there have been about 30 aircraft incidents, including the fall of an aircraft part onto the grounds of an elementary school—all we hear from the Japanese government officials is that they will inform the U.S. forces of our concerns. But nothing really changes. This is the current situation of the Japan-U.S. Security

\(^2\) Status of Forces Agreement between Japan and the United States is referred as Japan-U.S SOFA in this translation.
Arrangements. I think both governments keep in close contact, but as Okinawa Prefecture is at the forefront of the security arrangements, we rightly question, “What about the Okinawan people’s lives?” It is important to provide security for liberal democracy around the world, but what about the rights of Okinawa Prefecture in Japan?

When I speak about this issue, I get criticized on the internet with comments such as, “Are you linked to Chinese nationalism or supporting China?” I feel frequently threatened.

We have so many issues to tackle, such as the history of the relocation of bases including Futenma Air Station. Since I became Governor of Okinawa, our allies have won all subsequent elections, including for the House of Representatives in 2014, the Prefectural Assembly, the House of Councilors, and the House of Representatives last year.

Even though we have lost in municipal elections against strong incumbent mayors, we have managed to win a significant number of the prefecture-level elections. These results show the public opinion of Okinawa. However, the Japanese government officials, including the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister, did not meet with me for six months after I was elected Governor. When the Mayor of Nago City was elected, they met him the next day. But I cannot see them even if I try to.

People always ask me why I’m not trying to discuss with the Japanese government to build stronger relationship, but we cannot have such discussions because I barely see them in person. That is the situation now. We cannot discuss any of the things we want to do.

Even with my clear victory margin of more than 100,000 votes, that is the situation which I find myself in now.

(Development of the Henoko reclamation work and the security situation in East Asia)

I have a lot to say but I only have 30 minutes. The last thing I want to talk about is the decision by my predecessor, who was the governor until three years and four months ago. One year prior to my taking over, he approved the plan for the reclamation of Henoko, and construction was supposed to start immediately. However, since I became Governor and have had a lot of discussions on the issue, construction of the new Henoko base is now three years behind schedule.

The construction work is expected to take ten years; five years to reclaim the land and another five years to build the facility on that land. Futenma Air Station was to move to Henoko immediately after that. However, it has already been delayed for three years, so even if we rush the process, it will take a minimum of ten years. It could take twenty years for various reasons. The reason why I am saying this is
that international circumstances could change. I am not sure if it will actually happen, but as an example, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un are to meet in May.

In addition, the U.S.-China relationship may change; it could become more of a partnership, for example. The views of North Korea and the Republic of Korea may change as well. Given these potential shifts in international relations, it is not clear if the new base, which requires us to reclaim parts of the beautiful ocean in the next 15 or 20 years, could effectively respond to security situations in the world as well as in Asia in the future.

I believe that international circumstances will change over such a long period. It has already been 30 years since the end of the Cold War, but back then, we did not expect that the Soviet Union would become a nation like Russia.

If the original plan approved by my predecessor were on track, then seawalls should have been established as indicated by the red lines on the construction map of Henoko Bay. So, if the construction work had followed the original schedule, we should have the red line (seawalls) in Oura Bay. The dotted lines on the map show where the sand is going to be placed, and the goal is to fill that area with a large amount of sand carried by two million 10-ton dump trucks.

However, construction is in progress up to the three red lines. It has taken three years to get to the seawall marked with the red lines.

So, the seawalls shown on the map will be established with a large amount of sand carried by two million 10-ton dump trucks. This could result in environmental damage as foreign species may be brought in. Although you may think that, in light of the court’s ruling in favor of the Japanese government, the construction work would move forward, it is actually not progressing as smoothly as expected for these reasons.

Through this symposium, I hope that you will ask any questions you may have and understand our views on the current situation. In closing, I would like to thank all of you for your kind attention.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much, Governor Onaga. I think you’ve gotten this conference off to a great start. You’ve given us a comprehensive picture of the perspective in Okinawa, both the historical background and an up-to-date report about the status of the construction of the Futenma replacement facility in Oura Bay.

What I’d like to do now is to turn to our two designated commentators, and then after that we will open the floor up to questions. So first I’d like to introduce Professor Andrew Yeo who is a professor of
political science at Catholic University. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University and he has written a terrific book entitled *Activists, Alliances and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, which does a wonderful comparative analysis of anti-base movements in Okinawa, Korea and the Philippines. So, Andrew, if you could just stay seated and give your comments, and then I’ll turn to the second commentator. Thank you.

DR. YEO: Thank you, Professor Mochizuki and for also giving a plug for my book. I’d like to thank the Okinawa Prefecture and also the organizers of this conference for inviting me here. And it’s also an honor to share the stage with Governor Onaga and former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. You know, I have to say, I haven’t been to Okinawa in over a decade now, but the issue of U.S. bases in Okinawa and the Futenma replacement facility and the ongoing anti-base struggle still remains close to me.

As Professor Mochizuki mentioned, I published a book in 2011 on the topic of U.S. alliances and anti-base opposition which included a chapter on Okinawa. And I continue to write and comment on anti-base protests, most recently on Jeju Island in South Korea. Now, in Jeju Island, despite the completed construction of the naval base, the residents of Gangjeong Village continue to protest and hold a Catholic mass outside the base each day, and I know they’ve drawn inspiration from activists in Henoko.

As Governor Onaga mentioned, it’s been more than two decades since the announcement of the Futenma relocation plan, it’s actually 22 years to be exact. That’s almost an entire generation. Children who were born that year would now be graduating from college at this point. So certainly, Tokyo and Washington never anticipated this issue to drag out for so long. Meanwhile, the people of Okinawa have experienced disappointment, not only in the ability of power holders to reduce the base burden, but also in the process of democracy itself. Governor Onaga did not state it directly, and I don’t want to put words in his mouth, but he mentioned on more than one occasion strong political opposition to the Futenma relocation facility plan throughout Okinawa and even in parts of Japan. This opposition begins with Governor Onaga himself who has a mandate to represent the will of the Okinawan people.

Governor Onaga also remarked that the public will to scrap the Futenma relocation facility plan have been demonstrated in recent local elections, this includes the Nago City mayoral elections and the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly elections in 2016. Yet the will of the Okinawan people have been overruled quite literally by the government of Japan. Meanwhile, Okinawans are reminded each day of their base burden by the accidents, crashes, noise, pollution and crimes associated with U.S. bases. One can be sympathetic to Okinawans, particularly those who face real grievances which affect their daily quality of life. Yet there is a reason why the Futenma relocation plan has not gone away and will continue to loom ahead unless Okinawans and their supporters manage to shift the thinking of Japanese political leaders on the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese national security.

So in my book I refer to something called an elite security consensus. It’s this consensus which often exists within a host government that has policy makers and nations which host U.S. bases, such as Japan, South Korea, Germany or Italy, often believe the presence of U.S. military bases and the security relationship with the United States remains imperative to their national security strategy. Nowhere does
the security consensus run higher than in Japan. The foreign policy and national security establishment in Tokyo consider the alliance and U.S. bases as the cornerstone of their defense strategies.

Of course, the political left and far-right nationalist parties in Japan have called for less reliance on the U.S. and/or increasing the power of the role of the Japanese self-defense forces. But these voices often remain outside the core of the Japanese national security making, and if we also think about regional security, it also leads to different types of implications for peace and security. The challenges facing the anti-base opposition have become more difficult in the recent regional security climate. The rapid pace of North Korean nuclear missile tests the past two years, including several missiles which were fired over Japan, have served as a constant reminder of Japan’s vulnerability in northeast Asia.

Likewise, Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea, coupled with the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, and ever-increasing Chinese defense spending, does not create a political climate for Tokyo to pull away from the U.S. alliance or abandon the Futenma relocation facility plan. In other words, the security consensus may be tightening, not loosening.

So as Professor Mochizuki stated in an earlier exchange with myself on this issue, the challenge for the Okinawans to find some kind of basing alternative which can address the security imperatives and geopolitical calculations of the Japanese and U.S. governments, while at the same time reducing the burdens of Okinawans. Okinawan natives must somehow be able to find and work with sympathetic officials and policy makers in Tokyo to find a solution.

Now, I’m sure this has been tried many times over the past decade, and there were periods where I thought the Okinawans might achieve their goal as a security consensus wave, specifically during a brief tenure at the DPJ’s Yukio Hatoyama from 2009 to 2010, which also coincided with reduced U.S. military spending and fiscal tightening following the global economic crisis. But the security climate in northeast Asia is more severe than it was a decade earlier. Now, Dr. Mike Green at CSIS, just up the road from here, has stated that the Henoko Air Base option is to date the least bad solution for Futenma’s replacement. The U.S. government doesn’t see a credible alternative option operationally.

So, thinking about Okinawa’s base burden moving forward, there are still longer-term plans for relocating some marines from Okinawa to Guam. But that does not directly address Okinawan opposition to current base construction that’s taking place in Henoko as we speak, and as Governor Onaga showed in his slides earlier. So, this causes me to reflect on just a fundamental problem of providing security for Japan, for the region and the United States, and also the security needs of Okinawans. And here we have to ask, when we talk about peace and security, who is this peace and security for? Who is the reference point of peace and security?

For Okinawans, they think about peace from the perspective of human security, it’s about finding peace and security for their people, for their residents, for the local community. But for states, security and
peace refers to security for states, for national governments. This is really the bias of international relations, and really a realist’s version of international relations where you privileged the security of the state over all others. And I think finding some kind of solution and middle ground requires finding a new narrative or a new paradigm.

Now, Governor Onaga mentioned the upcoming Trump-Kim talks that may take place. I mean, we don’t know, we’re holding our breath, but Governor Onaga implies that the security situation is changing, and that’s true. As the security situation is – it’s not static, it goes up and down. So, if the upcoming Trump-Kim Summit paves the way for North Korean denuclearization – and that’s a big if, a more secure, peaceful path for northeast Asia might be realized. A new paradigm or a new narrative about Japanese and northeast Asian security needs to be shaped before any satisfactory solutions on the bases issue to be achieved by Okinawans. Thank you.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much, Professor Yeo. Our second commentator is former Secretary of Defense William Perry. I will give a fuller introduction when I introduce him for the keynote speech, but let me just say that when Secretary Perry was Secretary of Defense during the Clinton Administration, it was during that time that the Special Action Committee on Okinawa gave a report and the United States and Japan agreed to a plan to close Futenma Marine Corps Air Station and in its place build a Futenma replacement facility in Henoko. So, Dr. Perry.

DR. PERRY: Thank you, Mike. Is this working? Can you hear me back there?

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Yes, I think the mic’s on.

DR. PERRY: I will start off with a disclaimer, I am not in the American government today, nor am I likely to have profound influence on the decisions made by the Trump Administration, so you should understand – qualifying what I say with that understanding. I am however, very much aware of the issue which Governor Onaga was talking about today. I’m aware of it first of all because I was perhaps the prime mover in the U.S. government for the Futenma replacement plan several decades ago when I was Secretary of Defense. And most recently a year ago I visited Okinawa and actually went out to the Futenma base. So, I do understand and am very sympathetic to the issues which Governor Onaga was talking about.

I do want to provide some context to this discussion, well, why is the base there in the first place, why does the United States feel it necessary to have military forces in the Asia-Pacific region at all, and specifically at Futenma. These reasons don’t cast in concrete why any particular base is there or whether it will be in the future, but they do provide a context to understanding why we are doing today what we are doing. And of course, it all ties the broad issue of maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific Region, and specifically – that’s in general – and specifically dealing with any threats today from North Korea.
I want to point out that the last 70 years or so there have been an unprecedented period of peace in the Asia-Pacific Region. No historical precedence for that, and that peace has led to an amazing economic growth, and in particular it’s contributed to the vibrant economy of both the Republic of Korea and Japan. This economic success has many factors but underlying all of them is the security in the region and the vibrant trade that has flourished in this region. And, again, I must say we should not take this vibrant economy and the peace for granted, it is unprecedented, there’s been nothing like that 70-year period of peace in history anywhere in history.

As we consider that we should also understand there are two potential issues that could disrupt this peace, both of which everybody in this room is familiar with. The first one has to do with the disputes over islands in the Asia-Pacific Region, particularly in the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands, the latter being very close to the hearts of many Okinawans as well as being physically close to Okinawa. It’s my belief that while the issues in the South China Sea are contentious, that all the parties involved in that will maintain a peaceful approach to dealing with those issues and we will not see that disrupted into military conflict.

Both the United States and China particularly have overwhelming economic interest in there not being a military conflict over the South China Sea, and I think both governments will maintain their good judgment to see that that does not happen. The other potential military issue is the possibility of a military conflict with North Korea. Anybody that’s been reading the newspapers in the last couple of months understands that is not an academic issue, and the factors which lead me to be confident we will not have a military outbreak over the South China Sea do not carry over to the issue of potential military conflict with North Korea.

I have a very close historical familiarity with that issue, when I became the Secretary of Defense in 1994 it was the first crisis I faced, we almost had in 1994 a war with North Korea. Many of you perhaps are too young to remember that incident, but it was a very real issue. I thought at the time there was perhaps a 50/50 chance we were going to end up in military conflict with North Korea. So that was a matter of some great concern.

That problem has not gone away, and it’s now seriously aggravated by the existence of a nuclear arsenal in North Korea, so that if there is a military conflict, there’s a very real potential that that conflict could go nuclear with catastrophic results in many nations in the Asia-Pacific Region, certainly including Japan, and certainly including Okinawa. That potential for conflict led last week to a very surprising announcement, and that is the intention of the leaders of North Korea and the United States to have a summit meeting. The details of that are yet to be worked out, and I will have more to say about that in my speech after lunch. Nevertheless, it is a matter of some very real concern. Why is that summit meeting important to Okinawa?
It’s because while the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific is directly related to maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific Region, the forces at Futenma are particularly focused on the possibility of a North Korean conflict, particularly focused to that. And when I was Secretary of Defense I reviewed many times the contingency plan the United States has for responding to a North Korean invasion of South Korea. I don’t think that’s going to happen. I didn’t think it was going to happen then; I don’t think it’s going to happen now, but we have a responsibility to be prepared for it happening and to have a response. Those of you who have looked at maps of Korea will understand that the main metropolitan region of South Korea, the Seoul region with 20 million people, is located within about 50 miles of the border between North and South Korea. And any military invasion from the north would head directly for Seoul.

The U.S. military plan is based on the understanding that any military conflict with North Korea that South Korea and the United States would win, but the issue is how can we win while at the same time minimizing the damage to Seoul. That requires a very rapid response to any presumed invasion. A key to that response time so I may report to you, is a rapid reinforcement from the military forces based at Futenma, both the air and the ground forces are based there. They can make a difference in protecting the city of Seoul from any such invasion. That’s an unlikely contingency, but it’s a contingency that we have to prepare for. The more important factor is to get a resolution to the issue with North Korea so there never is such a military conflict. That’s what the summit meeting that is scheduled, that has been announced, is going to be all about, and we can all hope that it’s a success.

So, in my talk later on today I will be talking more specifically about how that summit meeting could affect the security of the region in particular—in general and in particular how it could affect the people of Okinawa. So, I look forward to talking to you this afternoon on that issue. Thank you very much.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you very much, Secretary Perry. So, the floor is now open for questions. So, if you could first give your name and your affiliation and to whom you would like to direct the question. So, Kevin? Is there a microphone?

MR. MAHER: Thank you, I’m Kevin Maher with NMV Consulting. As the governor knows, I was formerly the consul general of Okinawa when the realignment plan was re-negotiated. My question is for the governor. I think we all agree that the U.S. government at the time put the burden of the U.S. bases in Okinawa was very heavy. That’s why we in 2005 agreed to the realignment plan, which had two goals. First was large-scale burden reduction on the people of Okinawa, but at the same time maintaining the necessary capabilities, that was the objective of both governments.

And in terms of burden reduction, statistically in terms of the area in Okinawa, U.S. bases on the main island would go from about 19 percent down to about 11 percent, so it’s a pretty massive shift. It’s not just Futenma, it’s Makiminato and Camp Kinser, the bases in the south, part of Camp Foster - it’s a very

3 Unclear audio - “report” or “quote”
big package, but Futenma is a big part of that. But my question for the governor – but I would just back up and say in terms of capabilities, as Secretary Perry just pointed out, the need for the capabilities, the deterrent capabilities in Okinawa is probably greater now than it was in 2005 when the latest agreement was done.

But my question for the governor is, in the campaign, sir, you promised that you would block the relocation of Futenma. You said “Soshi” I believe was the term you used, and it seems to me that blocking relocation of Futenma is essentially blocking large-scale burden reduction for the people of Okinawa. So, my question specifically is in light of the last election in Nago, which is the local area where the – not a new base, but a relocation into an existing base would take place. Has that election result changed your thinking at all in terms of how you move forward? Will you continue to oppose the relocation, which blocks the large-scale burden reduction plan, or has your view changed on that?

GOVERNOR ONAGA [JAPANESE]
Thank you very much.

Even though your view is that the return of Futenma Air Station will reduce the burden on Okinawa, my view is slightly different.

The difference between the new base at Henoko and the original Henoko Base is that once the 165 hectares of the bay are reclaimed, the base will be equipped with a so-called berthing-capable 270 meter-long embankment that can accommodate amphibious assault ships.

In addition, some equipment that will be utilized for transporting ammunition chambers will be built. This function is not available at Futenma Air Station but will be possible at the new base.

Furthermore, of course, Futenma Air Station is dangerous as it is in the middle of a densely populated area. However, among the 30 recent accidents, the Osprey and the CH-53 fell on the shore of Nago City and in the Takae area, a northern part of Okinawa, respectively.

It may seem that Henoko and Futenma are a great distance apart, like 1,000 km, but actually they are only 30 km away from each other.

Therefore I cannot agree with the notion that building a new facility in such an area would contribute to reducing the burden on Okinawa.
As for the question of whether I would change my views on this issue in light of the results of the Nago Mayoral election, from my point of view, I won an election, received all four seats for the House of Representatives of Okinawa, gained 26 seats out of 48 in the Prefectural Assembly, won the head-to-head battle for a position on the House of Councillors, and our supporting candidates won the following election for the House of Representatives. However, the Japanese government has not listened to Okinawans’ public opinion at all.

They have continued the construction.

The Nago election turned out to be like that. Nonetheless, asking us to change our view based on the election result is like applying pressure to Okinawa. It sounds like Okinawa is treated differently within the Japanese democracy or local autonomy framework. This would never happen in any other prefecture.

That’s why I talk about Lake Towada, (excuse me), Lake Biwa, and Matsushima Bay in Miyagi. Reclaiming those beautiful waters would never happen on the mainland of Japan; the local politicians would never allow it.

The Japanese government listens to the opposition of the people in mainland but never listens to Okinawan public opinion. Given Okinawa’s history to become a part of Japan in 1879, and as the only battleground in Japan 61 years later during WWII, the people of Okinawa, including myself, feel that we have been treated differently in the last 70 years of the postwar period. Although we do understand the severe security environment, particularly the issues regarding North Korea and China, we ask that Okinawa not have to carry the burdens of the national security by itself.

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are important but, as you may know, during the Korean War, the major response capabilities were located in the Kitakyushu area. Therefore, there should be other places across Japan that can more effectively host deterrence capabilities (than Okinawa).

From our view, many U.S. bases are currently located in Okinawa due to opposition from the Japanese mainland, the geographical distance of Okinawa from the mainland, and the historically different circumstances of Okinawa. Even though Okinawans understand the importance of the Security Arrangements, we cannot enthusiastically say, “Thank you for protecting us.”

Therefore, we’d like to discuss this issue and include the possibility of an alternative plan. I do understand that Mr. Maher has in mind the relocation within Okinawa; however, we would like to kindly ask you to consider other options, and we look forward to your guidance.
DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you. I have a follow-up question, and I’d like to ask Dr. Perry and Professor Yeo to perhaps respond. And it’s about the role of Futenma in a possible Korean contingency. And as Dr. Perry mentioned, if there is a Korean contingency, and God forbid that there will be one, that currently according to probably war plans, that Futenma might play a major role perhaps as a staging area for a rapid response to deal with a Korean contingency.

But the question that I have is that any war plan would have to use the facilities that exist, but the question is whether in a Korean contingency, as the governor mentioned, is Okinawa such an ideal location to respond, and, in fact, there might be other places, such as in Kyushu or other bases on the main islands that might be more suitable for that kind of contingency.

And the second issue, it’s the related issue, is that the condition for the return of Futenma is the construction of this Futenma replacement facility in Henoko. But as a General Accounting Office report recently reminded us, the Henoko facility would not be able to meet the critical operational requirements during a high-intensity contingency like a Korean Peninsula contingency. And so, if that were the case, then what more needs to be done? And maybe the FRF is not the suitable replacement for Futenma. So, I was wondering if either Dr. Perry or Professor Yeo could respond to that, or the governor?

DR. PERRY: I’ll make one comment on that, and that is on the question of is Futenma ideally located to respond to a contingency, and the answer is, no. That same capability, that same facility located 50 miles from there or 200 miles from there would be equally adequate, but moving it would take ten years. And so, the question is, it’s not ideally located, but it’s there, it exists. Replacing it could be done, we could replace it with something with the same capability, but we’re clearly talking about not only enormous cost in doing that, but I would say a minimum of ten years to get a new facility up and operating.

DR. YEO: I had a similar reaction too. I mean, I don’t know the technicalities of all the specifics of what is needed to make something suitable for a large-scale contingency like Korea, but there is a path-dependent logic in that you have this base in Okinawa already and there’s already the infrastructure in place to support the U.S. military in any action on the Korean Peninsula. So to replace that is not just taking one base, removing it, and placing it on a different part of Japan or on Guam, but there’s a lot of other logistics there that make it much more difficult than just thinking about where do we plop one base somewhere in the Asia Pacific.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you. Yes, can you identify yourself and your affiliation and ask the question.

MR. YOUNG: Stephen Young with the Union of Concerned Scientists. I’ve got a question for the governor. Governor, regarding the new construction being done at the bases in Okinawa, if those indeed go forward and are completed, do you know if they would allow for the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to

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4 He probably means “Government Accountability Office”
Okinawa and are you confident that you would be told that that capability would be restored to Okinawa. And if was restored and if weapons were moved there are you confident you would be told that that decision had been made. 5

DR. MOCHIZUKI: So, this is about a possible deployment of nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

GOVERNOR ONAGA [JAPANESE]
With regards to the deterrence capabilities of Futenma Air Station or the Henoko facility, the question was asked earlier: how much does it cost? I didn’t mention earlier, but it will take 10 or more years at a cost of 9 billion dollar

The Japanese government is to pay this 9 billion dollar. Therefore, from the U.S. government’s perspective, this financial and budgetary contribution to the Marine Corps is a significant reason to support the “Henoko-only” policy in the Japan-U.S. security framework, I think.

Regarding nuclear weapons stored in Okinawa, as NHK’s special TV program illustrated, nuclear weapons were in Okinawa the whole time prior to Okinawa being returned in 1972. I myself lived through 27 years using U.S. dollars, holding a passport that said I was neither Japanese nor American. In that situation for 27 years, Okinawa played an undefined role in maintaining the security of Japan and the rest of Asia in the Cold War configuration.

At the time of the reversion in 1972, and this is also a matter of public record now, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato had a secret meeting and the prime minister permitted the U.S. to bring nuclear weapons to Okinawa in a contingency. We cannot investigate if we have nuclear weapons in Okinawa now, so we don’t know for sure. Nonetheless, according to a newspaper article published recently, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Akiba stated in the past that such an option should be considered, which does not negate the possibility. Even though Japan has the policy of three non-nuclear principles, a possible deployment of nuclear weapons in Okinawa has been considered multiple times by the government officials and they sound like they are treating Okinawa as an exception to the non-nuclear principles. To me, regardless of the existence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa, we are in a situation in which North Korean and Chinese missiles could easily reach Okinawa. Chinese missiles are said to be able to reach Kadena Air Base and Futenma in Okinawa, and North Korean missiles are said to be able to reach even Guam. I highly doubt that the over-concentration of armed forces in Okinawa effectively contributes to national security; rather, it might create an easy target.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Okay. We’re running out of time, so I want to ask the next two questioners to ask their questions first and then we’ll have a response from the panel. So first I saw Victor and then Ben.

5 The audio was not clear at the end.
MR. OKIM: My name is – can you hear me? My name is Victor Okim, U.S.-Japan Research. Governor Onaga, you mentioned focused basically Futenma and Henoko issues. But the late governor of Okinawa, Masahide Ota proposed very strong definitive idea after the very tragic rape case of young girl in Okinawa and following the Saco Agreement that all the U.S. military bases should be removed from Okinawa within 15 years. Of course, the idea was not accepted by both Tokyo and Washington as well.

So, my question is just talking about Henoko issues or Futenma issues, do you have a more definitive overall military base issues about Okinawa? And related question to Secretary Perry, what do you think that 15-year idea removing all the bases from Okinawa is rejected by the Defense Department as well as Tokyo? Do you think such definitive proposal, larger proposal can be acceptable in the future or is it possible that will not again come up with such strong and definitive proposal? That’s my question.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you. And Ben?

MR. SELF: Thank you very much. I’m Ben Self, vice president of the Mansfield Foundation. Thank you, Andrew, for being one of our Mansfield Scholars. I have a comment disguised as a question. Thank you, Governor Onaga. I’m very sympathetic to the situation of the people of Okinawa, particularly in Ginowan City, and we met – a Mansfield delegation went to visit Okinawa and met with the mayor of Ginowan and saw the concerns of the local residents who are themselves hoping for an early return of the Futenma facility. An early closure so that they can live a safer life with lower risk and reduced noise.

And seeing how close the residences are and the schools and the impact of the Futenma facility, I wonder why it wouldn’t be the top priority to somehow or other close that and remove that danger as soon as possible, even by moving it within the prefecture to an area with much lower density. And you described the land in Okinawa as if it’s all the same in terms of percentage and square hectares, but there’s a significant difference between the land in the center of Ginowan at the very heart of that town and the land farther north near Nago in the Henoko Base area.

So, I’m wondering how you can justify sustaining the presence and postponing the construction in Henoko for so many years while that keeps the burden and the risks right there in the Ginowan area. Thank you.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Secretary Perry, would you like to respond first to the question about possibly withdrawing all U.S. bases within 15 years, whether that’s an idea that is worth considering? And then I’ll have Governor Onaga address both questions.
DR. PERRY: Let me start off by saying that the preference of the U.S. soldiers who are based overseas is that they would prefer to be based in the United States. We’re not basing them in Japan or in Germany or in Korea for our convenience. We’re basing them there because we believe that a rapid response might be necessary in the case of any aggression. Could that situation likely change in 15 years? We have no way of knowing that really. I don’t see the rationale for an arbitrary limit like 15 years. They are not — our troops are not there for our convenience. They’re there because we have assessed, and the government of Japan has assessed, they might be needed to respond to the aggression, and more particularly that threat — might deter such an aggression and therefore they might be important to facilitate maintaining the peace.

So that’s my basic answer to the question. And I would say I see no basis for putting five, ten, fifteen — I mean, if you can tell me what the security situation is going to be like 15 years from now, then I can tell you whether we should have a plan to move those forces in 15 years.

DR. MOCHIZUKI: Thank you. Governor Onaga, you have the last word.

GOVERNOR ONAGA [JAPANESE]

I have two points to make. The first person said that Governor Ota had insisted on the complete relocation of the U.S. bases out of Okinawa within 15 years but the U.S. government did not accept the request. With that in mind, I am looking for an alternative.

The reason I was elected was because the former governor went against his election pledge of being against the relocation within the prefecture, including Henoko; in the third year of his term of office, he accepted the relocation. I was Mr. Nakaima’s campaign manager for his two elections.

I was in charge of the election. I worked on the understanding that we were never to agree to relocation inside the prefecture. So, the former governor changing his policy without consulting me or anyone else was a shock to me as well as to Okinawan people.

While the Japanese Government claimed that “Henoko was the only solution,” I did everything in my power to meet with the government to discuss possibilities, including alternative plans, but they refused to meet me for six months after my election. This means that they rejected the opportunity for discussion.

At the Supreme Court, it was decided that this issue was not something that could be solved in court, so it facilitated discussions between Okinawa and the Japanese government to reach an agreement, with the hope that the U.S. government would also agree to such an agreement.
The court also said that, as its recommendation for the mutual settlement, its ruling does not give any legal reinforcement to the positions of either party.

There is an organization called the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council which handles the litigation disputes between the nation and a prefecture. This council also concluded that this issue would not be solved in the legal arena and tried to facilitate a discussion between the two parties. Unfortunately, we couldn’t even have a dialogue with the national government of Japan.

We’ve exchanged our opinions with the prime minister through the vice governor and the deputy chief cabinet secretary, but they’ve insisted that there is no other option but relocation to Henoko. I have some ideas but I don’t know if I should share them in public.

Also, a gentleman from the Mansfield Foundation argued that Nago is a long distance away, but this is not what Okinawans think.

Ginowan and Nago are only 30 km apart. There are 60,000 people living in Nago and 100,000 people living in Ginowan.

This beautiful ocean with coral reefs, which is home to dugongs and 5,800 other creatures, including 262 endangered species, is about to be reclaimed. Now that there are protesters outside the construction site, helicopters are bringing in construction equipment such as power shovels in the air over our citizens. There are 600 riot police on site to deal with the protesters, while Japan Coast Guard ships patrol from just offshore.

I don’t know anywhere else in Japan that has such a method to build military bases.

If this were attempted in any other prefecture, Japanese democracy would not allow it. However, Okinawa Prefecture has this “special” treatment where things like this do happen.

Of course Futenma is the most dangerous base, but incidents of aircraft parts falling off have actually happened in Takae in northern Okinawa, and in the Abu region, the coastal area near Nago. They took off from Futenma but the parts fell off in the northern areas.

Okinawa is such a small island. Having schools and nursery schools is one of the reasons why Futenma is problematic, but it is wrong to think that the relocation to Nago is not a problem. According to experts,
the new Henoko military base could house 100 Osprey aircraft, which would cause all sorts of different problems such as noise pollution.

If 100 aircraft are deployed there, given that we have had so many accidents with just over a dozen aircraft, I highly doubt that the people in Nago would say, “We have fewer people here, so they are welcome,” regardless of the results of the recent election.

Also, Okinawa is built on tourism. There are areas still to be promoted in the North.

The central to southern areas have many tourism locations like Shuri Castle and other castle sites. However, these areas may not fully entertain repeat visitors in the future.

So, we would like to register some of the areas north of Nago as Natural World Heritage Sites. In that way, the Nago region could attract tourists in the future.

Nonetheless, there will be a big military base which can accommodate 100 aircraft right next to where we want tourists to come and see the beautiful ocean in Nago.

If that happens, the area north of Nago will not get enough benefits from tourism. Manufacturing will also suffer.

So, everyone in Okinawa has struggled with trying to solve the concerns of both Ginowan and Nago. For the past 70 years since WWII, all Okinawans have struggled to decide which side of the two parties they should stand for and it has sometimes led to arguments with neighbors or relatives who have an opposite standpoint. That has been the life of Okinawan people.

Even after the new Henoko military base is built, this argument is definitely going to continue.

Is Okinawa an anomalous place where neither the democracy of Japan nor America applies? If Okinawa keeps carrying the base burden, will it help others to carry out their own democracy in a positive way? None of this has been clearly explained to me. From my point of view, it’s all a top-down approach with armchair theory. If we keep discussing the current security arrangements with a very shortsighted reasoning, such as removing current residents from remote islands to build a new base, it will lead to a very problematic outcome in the future. We do not know where military aircraft might crash. I would like you to understand that this issue could lead to a very serious outcome.
DR. MOCHIZUKI: Okay. Well, I want to thank everyone on the panel, Governor Onaga, Professor Yeo, and Secretary Perry. And I want to thank all of you for your attention and terrific questions. So please join me in thanking the panelists. We’re going to have about – is it about a 25 or 30-minute break for lunch. And lunch is that way, so if you could pick up your lunch and then you can eat it here in this room and we will reconvene at around 12:30 for the keynote speech. So, thank you very much.